CD/PV.648
25 March 1993

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 25 March 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gerald Shannon (Canada)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 648th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to inform you that I shall convene an informal open-ended consultation of the Conference, immediately after we conclude the list of speakers, to consider the proposal advanced by the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar, at the 645th plenary meeting of the Conference. That proposal was reviewed yesterday, at the Presidential consultation, and I felt that it would be appropriate to have a wider exchange of views on it, in order to review the text circulated at the meeting held on Monday by the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. As this matter has already been brought to the attention of non-members who participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, it is understood that the informal consultation is also open to non-members.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Mexico, Switzerland, Greece and Cuba, as well as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, who will introduce the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group, which has been circulated as document CD/1185. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): We are pleased to see an eminent and active Canadian diplomat presiding over this Conference. We wish you success in your task and offer you the delegation of Mexico's full cooperation.

Allow me before I begin my statement, to refer to the suggestion you have just made to us. The proposal that there should be a joint statement from the Conference on Disarmament about the Register of Conventional Arms in New York is highly interesting and as all the delegates who attended the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments this week will know, I repeat, as they will know, unfortunately many delegations, I emphasize, many delegations, are not in a position to agree to such a joint statement at this stage of our work. I hope that you will take this situation into account if - as I hope you will not - you convene us in informal session at the end of this meeting.

The year 1993 began very well for disarmament. In January the Convention on the elimination of chemical weapons was signed and the United States and the Russian Federation also signed the START Two agreement. We nurture the hope that 1993 will also end well. Substantive progress is expected in various spheres, including the four that we have decided to focus on in our annual meeting: the complete prohibition of nuclear testing, negative assurances, outer space and transparency in armaments. It is true that the Ad Hoc Committee on the first of these subjects still has no negotiating mandate and that many countries consider the task that has been assigned to it for the coming months to be modest in the utmost. However, we feel that in this sphere there could be changes very shortly in the positions of some nuclear-weapon States. We are therefore awaiting an announcement that could have very important consequences for nuclear disarmament. We consider that the time is ripe to achieve a CTBT and we have the hope that the political leaders will make use of the opportunity.

Apart from the four topics to which we have agreed to give formal treatment, we shall continue informal consultations on non-proliferation in all its aspects. We feel that the meetings held recently on this subject have given us a glimpse of greater readiness for more detailed consideration. Since the beginning of the year there has also been progress in the First Committee of the General Assembly. In particular the view was unanimously expressed that it is necessary to strengthen the United Nations Secretariat so that it is in a position to discharge fully the tasks which the Member States of the Organization have assigned to it. In a few weeks time the Disarmament Commission will hold its annual meeting and there too we hope that further progress will be possible along the path outlined in the reforms agreed upon a few years back. But perhaps even more important is the first meeting of the preparatory committee for the 1995 conference to review and extend the non-Proliferation Treaty. We are persuaded that there is a need to take up the substantive aspects of the conference as of now, and it seems to us that it is incumbent upon all States parties to give serious thought to the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime established under that instrument. There can be no doubt that the success of the 1995 conference will depend on the outlook on substantive issues to be adopted by the States parties to the NPT, and most particularly the nuclear-weapon States.

In this first part of our annual meeting, we have heard a good number of statements partially or entirely given over to the question of transparency in armaments. The delegation of Mexico would like to offer a few remarks on this topic, which, as we all know, is provisionally on our agenda. In accordance with resolution 46/36 L of 1991, the General Assembly requested the Conference on Disarmament to address the question of the interrelated aspects of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, including military holdings and procurement through national production, and to elaborate universal and non-discriminatory practical means to increase openness and transparency in this field. The General Assembly also requested the Conference to address the problems of, and also the elaboration of practical means to increase, openness and transparency related to the transfer of high technology with military applications and to weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with existing legal instruments. The foregoing is part of a much broader endeavour that the General Assembly decided to carry out over time and following various avenues. Ours is just one of them.

Last year, under the direction of Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands, saw a first stage consisting of the elaboration of the technical procedures necessary for the effective operation of the Register of Conventional Arms, set up at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, together with the modalities for early expansion of the scope of the Register by the addition of further categories of equipment and inclusion of data on military holdings and procurement through national production. The General Assembly called upon Member States to make available information on imports and exports of armaments annually, as of this year, in accordance with the procedures mentioned above. By the middle of next year the Member States of the United Nations will also have to communicate their views on the operation of the Register and the addition of further categories of equipment and the elaboration of the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production. In that year - next year - the Secretary-General will have to draw up a report on these topics to be considered during the forty-ninth General Assembly. Among other things, the Secretary-General's report will have to take into consideration the results of the review of these issues which, in turn, will be put forward by the CD. Hence the provisional inclusion of this topic on the Conference's agenda.

What is the purpose of all these efforts within the United Nations system with regard to what is known as transparency in armaments? Resolution 46/36 L gives us a few elements to respond to that question. We read that "excessive and destabilizing arms build-ups pose a threat to national, regional and international peace and security". and in the second operative paragraph the General Assembly "declares its determination" to prevent this "excessive and destabilizing" accumulation "of arms, including conventional arms". It is obvious that, in the lengthy negotiations on the text of the resolution in question, it was not possible to reach agreement on which weapons would be covered by the Register beyond conventional weapons. An agreement for the inclusion in the Register of weapons of mass destruction, among other things, was simply overlooked. This is the origin of part of the task entrusted to us by the General Assembly.

When the General Assembly talks about the "excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms", my delegation considers that reference is being made to all arms. We would put nuclear weapons in place first. It may be thought that the production of a few atomic bombs in 1945 in what was until then a nuclear-free world was not only "excessive" but also "destabilizing", since it gave rise to unbridled competition in this sphere. The growing militarization of outer space could also be described as an "excessive" and doubtless "destabilizing" activity. And who is to decide that a given country or region is accumulating an excessive quantity of armaments? Could it be the main producers and exporters of arms who will take that decision? How can we justify a situation where, in their desire to find and/or keep their arms markets, some Governments, even at the highest level, agree to act as sales agents?

Many countries, including certainly some of the advocates of the issue of transparency in armaments and enthusiastic supporters of the Register, should feel very uncomfortable. On the one hand, they appear resolute in wanting to curb this "excessive accumulation" of conventional weapons, and on the other they insist on placing their own arms in any market open to them. In this room we have been told that the uncontrolled proliferation of conventional armaments is exacerbating many regional and local conflicts and causing instability on a scale not seen for many years. We have also been told that the Council of Europe has already expressed alarm at the accumulation of conventional weapons in certain regions and that the member States of the European Community have supported the United Nations Register. The key words seem to be "uncontrolled proliferation", "conventional weapons" and "certain regions". All of this without a doubt will give rise to discussion which we can already say will be lively in the Ad Hoc Committee chaired by the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt.

Another aspect of the question is that of the transfer of high technology with military applications and weapons of mass destruction, which has been taken up recently by the distinguished representatives of Argentina and Brazil. For too many years some scientifically advanced countries have unsuccessfully sought to monopolize scientific knowledge and its technological applications. It has been a chimerical exercise, the results of which are obvious: the proliferation of knowledge, even in such fields as the nuclear sphere, and the multitude of proof that ideas do not respect frontiers and that any technology, however sensitive, has a price that some, though not all, can pay and are ready to pay. My Government is persuaded that, despite some doubts about the Register as it now stands, the topic of transparency in armaments deserves careful analysis to serve as a basis to strengthen the role of the United Nations in this sphere. The Register is a very modest step in that direction, but we nurture the hope that the members of the CD can reach agreement to ensure success and its early expansion. Certainly we will not achieve this if, as we have heard here, our focus is based on what has been described as "pragmatic principles". Almost all of us are in favour of pragmatism and many of us have principles, but we do not believe that our pragmatism could lead us to defend "pragmatic principles".

In concluding I should like to offer a few thoughts that we shared a few days ago with the members of the Trade and Development Board when considering the subject of the possible establishment within UNCTAD of an ad hoc working group to explore the issue of structural adjustment for the transition to disarmament. After four decades of an unbridled arms race, the international community is moving towards détente and a reversal of that trend. How to demilitarize the economy - at the worldwide and national level - is one of the biggest challenges we face today. For years, some of us have been emphasizing the imperative need to put an end to the arms race, underlining the close relationship between disarmament and development, proposing and supporting practical measures. For example, we advocated a reduction in the military budgets of all countries, particularly the main military Powers. We have also examined on many occasions the economic benefits that could flow from general demilitarization. Now that a new era seems to be dawning in international relations, many countries, including almost all those that took part most enthusiastically in the arms race, are falling over themselves to reduce the economic burden of the arms build-up. Chemical weapons have been abolished, the nuclear arsenals of the two main military Powers are going to be reduced, nuclear tests have been temporarily suspended in three nations, the Register already mentioned has been established within the United Nations, as I have already said, the nuclear-weapon-free zones are being consolidated, some military bases are being closed, military budgets are being reduced, and a new atmosphere is already being felt in the multilateral disarmament forums.

Despite these encouraging signs, many countries are discovering that disarmament will not be easy or cheap.

The destruction of chemical arsenals calls for a major investment if they are to be destroyed without affecting the environment. Something similar is happening with the measures necessary to stockpile the enormous quantities of nuclear material, including plutonium, that were accumulated over several decades. What is more, in countries such as those of the former Warsaw Pact, the prevailing situation encompasses a tragic paradox: in their transition towards a market economy, there is an ever-increasing need for a massive injection of financial resources - resources that are slow in arriving because of the sad state of their economic structures - to develop, among other things, their exporting sectors so as to earn foreign currency. But one of the few forms of high technology that those countries possess - particularly the Russian Federation and Slovakia - is precisely military technology. Hence in their transition towards a market economy they have to maintain their military industries and seek new markets for their armaments. This will surely not be to anybody's benefit in the long-term: those who export weapons will not be able to break the circle of militarization of their economies; those who import them will continue to squander their money. Fortunately this does not affect Mexico, whose military expenditure is among the lowest in the world. But for years we have been taking an interest in the size of military expenditure internationally because this affects the development of the world economy, the state of which has a direct impact on almost all countries, including the economically less advanced ones. Hence our interest in the issue of structural adjustment for the transition to disarmament.

To close, the question of the conversion of military capacity to civilian uses is highly complicated and a start must be made on studying it in a multidisciplinary manner, ranging from the merely arithmetical aspects of the military and industrial sections of national budgets to the concepts of national and international security, via the military doctrines of various countries and the perceptions each has of its own security. And here emphasis must be placed on transparency with regard to military arsenals and the transfer of armaments. The development and expansion of the Register established by the United Nations on these topics will be a fundamental element in this regard.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Marín Bosch for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair, and I can assure him that I heard his comments. It is my decision to convene open-ended informal consultations near the conclusion of the plenary, and I assume he will take advantage of that informal session to further advance his views. I now give the floor to the representative of Switzerland, Ambassador von Arx.

Mr. von ARX (Switzerland) (translated from French): Since my delegation is taking the floor for the first time with you in the Chair, Sir, allow me at the outset to extend my congratulations to you on your election to this lofty responsibility. In the few meetings under your guidance, you have already convinced us by your experience and your efficiency.

Arms control and disarmament may be considered as one of the most successful areas of achievement of the post-cold-war period. Many bilateral agreements, regional or international, have been concluded and measures have been taken, which beyond any doubt contribute to the strengthening of international security. Here I will mention only the culmination of these efforts, namely: the agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons which was signed by more than 130 States last January in Paris.

Thus we may be pleased with the results achieved in recent years. But much still remains to be done and we must watch over the effective application of these agreements and measures. I would just like to quote a few examples. In spite of the international instruments we have, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains a major problem which the international community must continue to examine as a matter of priority. The year 1995 will be decisive for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We will also have to give even more attention to the question of conventional weapons. These questions among many others will have to be dealt with in a suitable framework.

Switzerland follows with great interest all international efforts in the area of confidence-building measures, arms control and disarmament. It participates wherever it can, for example, in the framework of CSCE, in the work being done and in the application of the measures approved. To date, Switzerland has ratified all the global agreements negotiated within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and the institutions which preceded it. It also plans to ratify very shortly, subject to the necessary parliamentary approval, the latest convention - the one on chemical weapons - which it signed in Paris. It also intends to contribute to the establishment of the new chemical weapons organization in The Hague, to which it plans to offer, as far as possible, the services of its renowned nuclear and chemical laboratory in Spiez and an advanced chemical industry and it also intends to train some 60 inspectors for the organization (OPCW). Switzerland also participates actively in all international efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and will not fail to join in addition in the exchanges of information for the establishment of the Register of Conventional Arms.

It is along these lines that my delegation could follow the draft decision presented by the delegation of the United States on 22 March concerning "transparency in armaments". And since today we are going to receive the report of the Group of Scientific Experts, I wish to point out that Switzerland actively supports the efforts being made by this group and is in favour of an expansion of the activities of this very group.

(Mr. von Arx, Switzerland)

On the basis of the excellent report from the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war period", I would like to raise one point which my Government considers to be particularly important: in order to fulfil our tasks to the satisfaction of the greatest number of States, that is, in order to aspire to universal acceptability of the measures taken, in order to achieve this, we must have appropriate machinery. In this respect we are bound to note that the Conference on Disarmament, by its composition, is no longer the framework which is the best suited to present-day realities. We think that it should be open to all States that wish to join it and have concretely manifested their interest and commitment. The Conference on Disarmament, the only body which negotiates agreements of global scope, is a valuable institution, which in the general interest must be able to continue its work under the best possible conditions. But its limited membership somehow weakens its global vocation or, in other words, its global legitimation. Therefore, in the view of my authorities, this membership should in the sense already formulated be as broad as possible. The arguments put forward against this idea have, in our opinion, lost their relevance. This Conference of 40 members only has hardly been working any faster than other bigger organizations. Let us remember that it took 15 years following the conclusion of the ENMOD agreement to achieve any new results. What is ultimately decisive is indeed the political will to achieve something, whatever the size of the forum in which it is called upon to operate. Furthermore, we are sceptical about the argument concerning regional balances: the principle of consensus prevailing in the Conference on Disarmament makes it less necessary, without counting the present lack of focus, the need to redefine the regions and the growing importance of functional groupings.

To return to the notion of the legitimation of our body, which I have just used, I would like to recall, that it would not be the first time that we discussed this problem. Thus there were, for example in the history of our institution, that is, at the time of the institutions which preceded the Conference on Disarmament, times when member States adopted the policy of the empty chair or did not support the results produced by the Conference, because they had doubts about the legitimation of this body. The consequence of this was, as we all know, a first step towards the democratization of our institution. It is the conviction of my authorities, that it is now time to take a second step in this direction.

In conclusion I would like to assure you that my Government remains prepared to associate itself, actively and constructively, with international efforts to strengthen and advance international security. But at the same time it hopes that its request for full and complete participation in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, which was made some years ago, will be taken into consideration during this session of the Conference on Disarmament. The commitment manifested thus far by Switzerland bears witness to its will to fulfil the obligations and responsibilities which would arise from the status of a full member. Finally, the already close relations between the host State and the Conference on Disarmament would be even further strengthened in this way.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank Ambassador von Arx of Switzerland for his statement and for the kind words he expressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Greece, Ambassador Ghikas.

Mr. GHIKAS (Greece): Mr. President, since this is the first time I am taking the floor in this Conference, I wish to extend to you my congratulations on the assumption of your functions. This is a critical juncture for the Conference, when considerable skill and in-depth knowledge of disarmament issues are fully required and there could be no more propitious coincidence than your term of office. You can count on our determination to cooperate with you and support you in your endeavours for a felicitous solution of the most urgent disarmament issues. Let me also take this opportunity to convey through you my warm thanks to your predecessors, Ambassadors Deyanov of Bulgaria, Amorim of Brazil and Servais of Belgium, as well as to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui.

With the chemical weapons Convention behind, the Conference is now entering a new phase: a paradoxical situation reflecting both the assertiveness for the recent, much sought-after, success and the uncertainty for the new, formidable challenges facing us. Challenges arising from the considerable number of problems to be tackled. Indeed, what has been done for a given category of weapons remains to be done for every other category. Peace is global and indivisible. So must be the prohibition of the use of every kind of weapons. Challenges arising from the new international relations pattern, requiring new strategies, based on quite different approaches than the ones used so far, and new methods of proceeding as well.

That is why our agenda matters so much. Chemical weapons are but part of the problem. As long as arms regulation does not cover, in an equal manner, nuclear, biological and conventional weapons, all hard-won credibility risks being lost. Some steps in the right direction have already been taken. An Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has been re-established. That could lead, in due course, to a treaty for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Besides the present moratoria on nuclear tests by the United States of America, the Russian Federation and France are positive contributions to that end. Nevertheless, the non-proliferation Treaty has to be adhered to worldwide. We urge all countries which formed part of the former Soviet Union and possess nuclear weapons to do so as soon as possible. And we hope that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will reconsider accordingly its recent decision in this respect. The bold measures provided for by the chemical weapons Convention have been stated on several occasions. I would have thought that, however bold, those measures are by no means original. Anyone having dealt with arms control issues at the regional level, notably at the European level, would be familiar with all notions contained in the said Convention, including the famous "challenge inspections" that is to say the cornerstone of the Treaty on conventional forces in Europe, inasmuch as it describes in so many details locations to be inspected and inspection modalities. Which proves in turn, the extreme usefulness of regional arrangements both as a complement and as a pattern for global agreements.

As I said earlier, peace and security are global issues covering soldiers and weapons including technology related thereto. As far as the latter are concerned the global element is to be considered at the production and at the transfer level. Both should be limited to the point where essential security measures are met, of either the producer or the purchaser, but not beyond. Therefore ample and precise information is required, which is to be verifiable. Wherever that verification leads to negative conclusions, further action should be envisaged. This is an elementary scheme for transparency as we conceive it. Some very helpful ideas in this connection have been aired by Ambassadors Wagenmakers and Swift, to which my country can fully subscribe. In fact, the transparency issue is all the more important for my country as we witness next door to us, let alone a little farther away, a formidable proliferation of all kinds of weapons, not least conventional ones. Faced for half a century with an apparent immobility, Europe is now the focal point of a turmoil that has shattered several countries, threatened as many others, and whose tremendous consequences are there to stay. Our close proximity to the region under fire explains our concern and our willingness to be involved in a peaceful procedure of the settlement of the conflict, to put an end to present bloodshed and distress and set the foundations for a lasting solution. Transparency, when properly applied, is the most appropriate confidence-building measure. But once again, one should not discriminate by taking out what he does not like, for that would be a virtual distortion of the matter.

The fact that my country attaches such an importance to disarmament issues combined with its particular geographical position accounts for our firm determination to join this Conference as a full member. Not only has Greece been following closely the works of the Conference from its very inception, it is also party to all agreements or arrangements dealing with disarmament. Now, we have been told that an expansion of membership is regarded with scepticism. The composition question is being raised - as though we were talking about the ingredients for a good cake recipe - as is the fact that the consensus principle, which of course should and shall govern the talks, would be endangered. To our minds, the experience of the chemical weapons Convention suggests otherwise. The fact that those talks were confined to only 39 countries has not solved the consensus problem. If I have it correctly, the Conference final report was sent to New York with an endless row of national declarations - if that can be called a consensus - and all of it was created by insiders rather than outsiders, which however participated actively in the works. Still, it was precisely those outsiders that were subsequently invited to sign what others had negotiated for them. Do you consider this to be a just and right solution? And is that the same solution we are seeking to apply to all further negotiations? Needless to remind you that in 1978 it was agreed that the membership issue would be considered ever since, "at regular intervals". I am afraid I have to report that there has been so far no interval whatsoever, be it regular or irregular. This is the first time the issue is being considered. Let us hope that the

Conference will be able to find an appropriate solution. I am confident that our two coordinators, Ambassadors Marín Bosch and O'Sullivan will carry out their mandate in the best possible way.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Ghikas of Greece for his statement and for the kind words he expressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, Mrs. Bauta Solés.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on discharging your functions as President of the Conference on Disarmament. You may count on the cooperation of our delegation. We also wish to express gratitude for Mr. Deyanov of Bulgaria's efficient performance as your predecessor.

Before starting my statement, I wish to take this opportunity to endorse expressly, one by one, detail by detail, the views put forward at the beginning of his statement by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. Miguel Marín Bosch, concerning initiatives associated with the topic of transparency in armaments, and with regard to which many delegations actually, almost 50 per cent of the membership of this Conference, expressed profound reservations about their content in the course of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. I associate myself fully with the procedural proposal made by Ambassador Marín Bosch. That proposal by Mexico, and now by Mexico and Cuba deserves to be taken into account by you, as our rules of procedure stipulate.

As has been emphasized several times, the subject of transparency in armaments has been described as important by almost all delegations present here at one time or another. Our delegation also considers it important. However, to say that the item is important does not imply - still less is it tantamount to saying - that it constitutes a priority among the objectives presented to this Conference. Unfortunately we do not see the same willingness to take up other items, and for that reason it might be useful to dwell on this topic, if only for a moment. In so doing the first thing that strikes one is that the underlying arguments, between one case and another, are not necessarily the same. Some people feel the topic of transparency, and more particularly that of the register of information on conventional weapons, is important because it is a confidence-building measure, because it is a topic that is "ripe" for negotiation and because it is of regional importance. For others, who consider that confidence-building measures are not an end in themselves, that participation in the Register of Conventional Arms is a voluntary matter, that the basic mandate of this Conference is to negotiate and conclude disarmament agreements, especially in the nuclear sphere, the item is important, not because of its own inherent content, nor because of the contribution it will make to international - including of course regional - peace and security, but precisely because its relevance should not be over-inflated and take up most of the substantive endeavours of this body.

It is clear then that although we all may agree that this a matter of importance, the reasons that prompt us to say so may be as different as day and

(Mrs. Bauta Solés, Cuba)

night or what is superficial from what is profound. That is why it may be a necessary condition for our work to recognize the general understanding on the importance of the item, but not a sufficient condition so that in this regard we should take for granted that there is a binding unanimity of views which might prove misleading when it comes to interpreting what are the truly priority tasks for this Conference. We hope that other areas in our sights will soon have prospects for progress as good as those enjoyed today by the item on transparency in armaments.

In analysing the relevance of the item on transparency, we do so taking into account all the elements of the General Assembly resolutions (resolution 46/36L, including paragraph 11 (b), and resolution 47/52). We hope that the Conference, when it concludes its work this year, and makes reference to the results of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee - whose Chairman, Ambassador M. Zahran of Egypt, we congratulate - will be in a position to forward to the General Assembly considerations on all the aspects of the topic, including the expansion of the Register of Conventional Arms.

We wish to place on record our satisfaction at the fact that the mandate of the Committee is that provided for in the resolution in question. Although we regret the unnecessary upsets that delayed the establishment of this body this year. We are pleased to see the prospects opened up to us by the agreed programme of work regarding the elaboration of definitions of terms that need to be elucidated such as those of: excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, military holdings and procurement through national production and practical measures to increase openness and transparency in these fields. The appointment of a Friend of the Chair on this item of the programme of work, together with the second entitled review of the problem and elaboration of practical measures to increase openness and transparency according to legal instruments in force related to the transfer of high technology with military applications and that of weapons of mass destruction, could be an initiative which will help the Committee to be successful in its work.

A great deal of emphasis has been placed on the importance for regions of the initiative in the field of transparency in armaments, but at least to our mind, it is clear that it is not enough to resolve the problems in these areas - it is necessary to draw up a set of political, economic, social and military measures, and to have the political will of all parties that have any part to play in the region in order to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions. An effective step in this direction would be for the main countries that supply arms to adopt effective measures of self-determination, including those of bringing about considerable reductions in their programmes for weapons research, development, improvement and production and their export as a step towards the creation of conditions favourable for resolving regional conflicts by peaceful means. The criterion of defensive sufficiency is relevant to reflection since it would not seem logical or right that the arms-producing countries should maintain an advantageous position in the military sphere vis-à-vis those who are obliged to import weaponry essential to ensure their self-defence, still less that they

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should use that profit by various means to try and impose their military and political interests.

The question of openness and transparency related to the transfer of high technology with military applications is a matter that we shall analyse in detail in the Ad Hoc Committee and which we shall deal with fully at that time. Suffice it to say today, that as a matter of principle, we favour the idea that any agreement on this topic should be reached through multilateral negotiations that are as universal as possible, because this will help to avoid discriminatory features in the final outcome that adversely affect the rightful interests of countries that do not have specific types of technology, whose dual use is crucial to the social and economic development of some nations. Unilateral controls are not the way to achieve transparency related to the transfer of high technology.

The question of openness and transparency related to weapons of mass destruction, we consider, is a matter on which this Conference must be in a position to make practical recommendations at the end of this session. It would also be useful for the legislation in force to be studied by its members so that measures can be adopted to enable accession to it by States which for the time being are not parties to it.

In document CD/TIA/WP.1, submitted by Cuba last year, paragraph 8 contains a proposal that the information supplied to the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms should immediately be made available to all the other participating States, for example through a permanently accessible database. The same paragraph suggests that the United Nations as a whole, and according to the mandate applicable to it, could issue periodical publications containing the information supplied by States. In paragraph 9 of the same document, in the part relating to regional participation in the Register, it is suggested that States could help in the process of dissemination by publishing full information on their legislation and administrative procedures with regard to arms transfers and supplying this information not only to the United Nations but also to interested States. These suggestions from my country, made as early as 21 July 1992, presupposed a positive response to participation by Cuba in the exchange of information in the Register on Conventional Arms, and I can confirm this on this occasion.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Cuba for her statement and for the kind words she expressed to me. Before I invite Dr. Dahlman to take the floor, I should like to ask whether any delegation wishes to take the floor now on matters other than the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. I take it the answer is no, and therefore I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Ola Dahlman, to introduce the Group's progress report on its thirty-fifth session.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I am pleased to report today on the recent session by the Ad Hoc Group held from 15 to 26 February 1993 and to introduce the Group's progress report contained in CD/1185. The session was attended by experts and representatives from 27 countries. Upon invitation by the Conference on Disarmament, a representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) attended the session. He reviewed, from a technical perspective, IAEA activities with special emphasis on monitoring the non-proliferation Treaty. It might in this connection be appropriate to point out the differences between the principles guiding the IAEA monitoring and those underlying the work of the Ad Hoc Group. IAEA is in its monitoring of the NPT collecting data primarily on the flow of nuclear material through declared facilities. Based on these data IAEA makes its own analysis and draws its own conclusions which are then reported to the member States. The basic data are however not made available but kept within IAEA.

The basic principle of the international verification system considered by the Ad Hoc Group is that of a service organization for participating States. It should provide free and easy access to all data obtained from a global network of recording stations. It should further provide routine compilation of data and analysis results obtained at the International Data Centre using standardized procedures. Conclusions, e.g. as to the nature of observed events, should, however, be drawn by individual States and not by the International Data Centre. It further became evident that the data volume within the IAEA monitoring system is only a small fraction of that anticipated in the seismological system or that exchanged in the Group's latest large-scale test.

At its session the Group concluded its work on the second large-scale technical test (GSETT-2) by finalizing a report on the seismological evaluation. A summary of this report is annexed to the progress report and the full report was adopted as a conference room paper of the Group and is thus available to the CD. The Group expressed its appreciation to Professor Harjes of Germany, who coordinated this evaluation and drafted the report.

Many of the issues brought up in the evaluation report have been touched upon by the Group at earlier occasions and have also been reported to the Conference on Disarmament. I will however make a few observations and highlight some of the conclusions. Seismological array stations, where a number of sensors are placed in a specific pattern to form a receiving antenna, proved to be most valuable and contributed 75 per cent of all the observations made during GSETT-2. Thus, as the progress report states, the global network of stations should include arrays to the greatest degree practicable. It was documented that the background disturbances, which limit the detection capability, varied by a factor as large as 10 between participating stations. This stresses the importance of taking great care when siting monitoring stations. I have on earlier occasions reported on the uneven station distribution on the globe and its consequences. The evaluation showed that the detection capability during GSETT-2 corresponds to magnitude 2.5 in the northern part of Europe to be compared with magnitude 5 in large areas of the southern hemisphere. As magnitudes are logarithmic values this means that the detection capability is 300 times higher in northern Europe compared to most parts in the southern hemisphere. Also the accuracy by which an event could be located is influenced in a similar way. Location errors of about

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

10 km in northern Europe should be compared to uncertainties exceeding 100 km or more observed in the southern hemisphere. If we want to achieve a verification system with high capability to observe events in all parts of the globe it is important to establish stations in areas which today are lacking high-performance equipment.

The Group noted that future monitoring environments and specific monitoring requirements will be set by participating States and may change over time. It is therefore impossible to establish a priori detailed requirements for the system. The Group however agreed that it would be necessary to conduct a cost-performance analysis of global seismic verification systems of different configurations. In a national contribution presented to the Group a first attempt was made to use computer modelling to identify optimal network configurations for given numbers of stations, either arrays or single stations. Additional such modelling will be needed, together with experimental data such as those obtained during GSETT-2, to establish a realistic cost-performance analysis for systems of different configurations and thus facilitate the efforts to achieve a cost-effective system.

The focus of the Group's efforts during the session was in-depth discussions on the reassessment of the existing concept of a global system as presented in the Group's fifth report (CD/903). The revised modernized system can, in a way similar to the one tested during GSETT-2, be divided into three components: a global network of stations, national data centres and an international data centre.

The global network of stations is to be composed of three parts. The Group refers to it as a three-tiered network. The first tier - the alpha network - provides event detection. It would tentatively consist of a global network of 40-60 high-performance array and single stations that would transmit continuous waveform data to the International Data Centre. The number of stations in the alpha network, their individual capabilities and their distribution thus determine the overall detection capability of the system. The second tier, the beta network, would provide data primarily for estimation of locations and depths of the events detected by the alpha network. The number of beta stations could be substantially larger than the number of alpha stations. The beta stations will make waveform data immediately available to the International Data Centre upon request as needed. The third tier, the gamma network, would comprise national and regional networks as available. These networks have been established primarily for the surveillance of national and regional seismicity. Data from the gamma network will be requested on a case-by-case basis to facilitate the analysis of events for which further data is considered useful.

The second component of the international system is the national data centres. Such a centre will be the gateway from a participating State to the International Data Centre and to other national centres, through which data and information will be exchanged. An International Data Centre (IDC) will be the third component of the system. The Group now considers that one such centre would be sufficient. The Group appreciates the offer by the United States delegation to provide a prototype IDC in Washington, D.C. for use in cooperative development and demonstration of the single IDC concept. The functions of the IDC will in principle be unchanged. The IDC is however supposed to work on a tighter time-scale and to produce a preliminary bulletin within a few hours of the occurrence of an event. The IDC will also base its work almost entirely on waveform data obtained automatically from the alpha and on request from the beta network.

High-speed communications are an essential element of the global system. In contrast to the situation which existed only a few years ago, high-capability global communications are now widely available and can be implemented as needed.

The Group considered a tentative time schedule for its future work, with the aim of beginning global testing of the new proposed concept by 1 January 1995. The Group is in its work critically dependent on a number of activities that take place between its sessions both in individual countries and as cooperative efforts among countries. The Group noted with appreciation the convening of an informal technical workshop in Canada from 17 to 22 November 1992. The results of that workshop greatly facilitated the Group's work during this session.

Education and training is of fundamental importance in establishing seismological facilities in new areas. The Group expresses its support to the efforts by Egypt to provide basic seismological training and information on the work of the GSE to scientists in African and Arab countries. The Group also expresses its support to those countries which assisted Egypt in this important work.

Mr. Michael Cassandra, who has for 10 years been serving as the Group's Secretary, has now left to meet new challenges. On behalf of the Group I would like to express to Mr. Cassandra our sincere thanks for his most valuable contribution to the work of the Group. Mr. Cassandra is succeeded by Ms. Jenifer Mackby and I very much welcome Ms. Mackby as our new Secretary. I would also like to express the Group's appreciation for the services provided by the secretariat throughout the session.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 26 July to 6 August 1993 in Geneva.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Dahlman, for introducing the progress report in document CD/1185. Does any member wish at this stage to address the progress report or comment on the work of the Ad Hoc Group? I give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): The United States welcomes the remarks by Dr. Dahlman on the progress being made by the Ad Hoc Group of

Scientific Experts and we thank him for presenting this information to the Conference. The United States remains committed to supporting the work of the GSE. To ensure that the system concepts are fully tested in a realistic environment, as Dr. Dahlman has pointed out, the United States has offered to provide a prototype International Data Centre in Washington, D.C., for use in the cooperative development and testing of a data exchange system. Furthermore, I would underline the point that Dr. Dahlman alluded to that if future tests of the GSE data exchange system are to be fully successful, a more uniform distribution of global stations should be used than in previous tests. The United States therefore hopes the Conference on Disarmament will encourage additional countries to cooperate and participate in the work of the GSE.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank Ambassador Ledogar of the United States for his statement. Are there any other delegations who wish to take the floor to comment on Dr. Dahlman's report? If not, I should like to inform you that, in accordance with the practice of the Conference, we shall consider the recommendation contained in the progress report, concerning the dates for the next session of the Ad Hoc Group, at the opening of the second part of the annual session of the Conference.

I announced at the opening of this plenary meeting that, in light of the exchange of views held yesterday at the Presidential consultations, I had in mind convening an informal open-ended consultation to consider the proposal advanced on 4 March by Ambassador Ledogar of the United States. The representatives of Mexico and Cuba have indicated that they do not favour further discussion on that initiative. May I clarify that I advanced the idea of an informal consultation in view of some recent indications that the text previously circulated could be the subject of negotiations to make it acceptable to all? - and it is my hope that this clarification satisfies the point raised by the representatives of Mexico and Cuba. As President, it is my duty to explore every proposal put before us and it is in that sense that I proposed an exchange of views today on the text before us, keeping in mind the fact that the text before us can be the subject of further compromise. Accordingly, as I announced at the outset of the meeting, I intend now to suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal open-ended consultation with the participation of non-members to consider the proposal before the Conference on the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms.

The meeting was suspended at 11.25 a.m. and resumed at 12.05 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 648th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

Does any delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): The United States believes that the Conference on Disarmament got off to an excellent start in January. This body

(The President)

decided to focus its work in four areas and established ad hoc committees within the first week of the session. The CD also successfully completed two reports in preparation of the United Nations First Committee resumed session. One report in particular, in our view, the CD's comments on the United Nations Secretary-General's "New dimensions" Report, is quite forward-leaning in its positive outlook on the future of arms control and disarmament in the post-cold-war era. All of this reflects, in my eyes, potential for progress, a new spirit, a new outlook, and a bright future for this body ... so what happened with the draft decision on the United Nations Register?

The United States is disappointed but not surprised that we are unable to take what we would have thought was a simple decision endorsing the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Three weeks ago, on 4 March, I proposed in plenary that the CD, as a corporate body, and a body that is autonomous from the United Nations, take action related to ensuring the success of the Register. It is true that there have been two consecutive United Nations resolution, in 1991 and 1992, dealing with the Register. But in my proposal, I was suggesting that the CD find some way to complement what has been done already in the United Nations.

Others are doing the same on a regional basis. There have been conferences in Buenos Aires, Warsaw, Tokyo, and next week, a conference in Florence. A decision also was adopted in Vienna at the CSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation several weeks ago supporting the United Nations Register. Moreover, TIA is on the CD's agenda. This is the first item the CD has added to its agenda in almost 10 years. The CD has been requested to examine questions related to military holdings, procurement, technology transfers, etc. These issues cannot be separated from the overall rubric of transparency in armaments and the United Nations Register. Therefore, wouldn't it have been only natural for the CD to take action similar to that which is being done by others regarding the Register?

I regret that one or two delegations have decided to block this modest proposal using the technique of a pocket veto. More troubling, however, is the apparent indication that some countries represented at this table are truly against and obviously afraid of transparency, openness, and measures that build confidence, both regionally and globally.

The future of the CD is in our hands. This body can become more active, and more relevant, or it can atrophy. If the former is to be our future, we certainly need to become more action-oriented. The draft CD decision proposed by the United States was an example of something that was action-oriented. The draft decision would not have obligated anyone. It simply stated the obvious by encouraging participation by CD members and CD non-member participants. The Register after all will only be successful if participation is great. In addition, the United States proposed that we exchange national submissions to the Register among ourselves here in Geneva. Those data would have already been public in New York.

My delegation therefore is saddened at this turn of events. Is this the same body which looks to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty? Is this the same body that wants to achieve some progress in negative security assurances or outer space arms control? In Washington and elsewhere, people will draw their own conclusions about the utility of the CD when worthwhile goals like the United Nations Register, a measure which, as has been pointed out, was approved without a single negative vote by the United Nations, and one which seeks to build confidence and openness among States worldwide, cannot be endorsed by the CD.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): What we had to say, about the Register on Conventional Arms established at the Headquarters in New York of the United Nations, we said at the beginning of this plenary meeting, in the statement we made this morning. My delegation reserves the right to return to this matter in plenary when it sees how, if this is the way it happens, the description of this matter is going to appear in the report that we will submit to the General Assembly in the autumn.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Marín Bosch for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? It appears not.

The secretariat has distributed today the weekly timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the week beginning 17 May. You will recall that, at the 646th plenary meeting, we confirmed that there would be no meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the first week of the second part of the session, between 10 and 14 May, due to the meeting in New York during that period of the Preparatory Committee of the review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We also agreed to re-schedule the plenary meeting to be held the following week for Tuesday 18 May. It goes without saying that the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. On this understanding I presume we may adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes our work for today, and I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 18 May, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

CD/PV.649
18 May 1993

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FORTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 18 May 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Jon Legg (Canada)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 649th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As the current President of the Conference, Ambassador Shannon, has been recalled to Ottawa for consultations, in accordance with rule 10 of the rules of procedure I have the honour of replacing him today.

At the outset, I wish to welcome warmly, on behalf of the Conference and myself, the new representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Dobrev, who is attending the plenary for the first time. In doing so, I wish to assure him of the cooperation of my delegation in the work of the Conference.

You will recall that, at the last plenary meeting of the first part of the annual session, the President announced that he intended to put before the Conference at the beginning of the second part of the session the recommendation contained in paragraph 13 of the progress report on the thirty-fifth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, circulated as document CD/1185, concerning the dates for the next session of the Ad Hoc Group. Accordingly, I shall proceed to do so at this plenary meeting, once we have listened to the speakers inscribed to address the Conference today.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Australia and Mexico.

I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador O'Sullivan.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): Mr. President, since this is the first time that I have spoken during Canada's presidency, I should like to congratulate you and Ambassador Shannon on the assumption of the leadership of the Conference on Disarmament and assure you that you have the full support of the Australian delegation.

I would like to offer some comments on the latest progress report to this Conference from the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, contained in document CD/1185, to which you have just referred and which we will consider later this morning.

Might I at the outset underline Australia's appreciation for the ongoing work of the Group, and in particular of Dr. Dahlman, its Chairman. During long years of political stalemate, the quiet work on seismic verification undertaken by the GSE in fact represented the only tangible progress being made under the Conference's auspices towards the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

I express Australia's thanks to those concerned: their patient work has left us with a solid technical basis on which to construct the multilateral legal undertakings of a CTBT.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

The report we have before us today confirms that the seismic technique offers the international community a technology which is sufficiently reliable to form the core of a future CTBT verification regime.

This core will, of course, need to be supplemented and complemented by other verification techniques. As the report indicates, further enhancement of the seismic technique and development of technical approaches to the future global verification network will also need to be pursued.

However, the central leg of a "verification pack" for a CTBT, a credible global deterrent against future nuclear testing, is clearly visible.

I make these initial remarks because it seems to my delegation that the cumulative effect of international developments affecting the nuclear-test-ban issue is such that the world community - and the Conference on Disarmament in particular - will very shortly be looking to reap fruit from the GSE. Fruit in the shape of a fully mature scheme for the practical and credible application of the best seismic science available to verifying compliance with a CTBT.

In this context, Australia supports the declared and legislated public policy position taken by the United States, most recently in President Clinton's 23 April statement: we share the belief that achievement of a CTBT should be a high-priority and time-bound process.

At the 1992 session of the United Nations General Assembly, the international community gave unprecedented levels of support to a resolution calling for progress towards a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We have also witnessed an unprecedented level of constructive activity by the nuclear-weapon States in applying testing moratoria, in proposing pre-negotiating consultative frameworks, and in agreeing and implementing deep cuts in existing arsenals of nuclear weapons.

Some of these initiatives have been favoured with the appropriate positive public recognition. Some have been carried through more modestly and with little fanfare.

Nevertheless, Australia believes that the atmosphere of the CTBT discussion has changed fundamentally, and that momentum towards negotiations will continue to build, including specifically here, in the Conference on Disarmament.

As its mandate shows, the GSE is a subsidiary technical body of this Conference. Its role is to inform in a technical sense a particular political discussion being pursued among national delegations in the Conference (or more specifically in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban). This implies a close and collaborative relationship which, I regret to say, has probably been the exception rather than the rule over previous years, chiefly due to stagnation of political discussions.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

Times are changing, however. There is a sharper focus in the Ad Hoc Committee on comprehensive nuclear-test-ban issues and on the practical implications. Australia considers that delegations individually - and perhaps the Conference as a whole - need to ensure that the GSE is fully informed as to the political debate in the Ad Hoc Committee and the options available. On the other hand, the time has come in our view for the GSE to re-examine its reporting. The CTBT verification implications of the fine seismic work the GSE undertakes need to be immediately and clearly intelligible to non-scientific members of the Conference. Increasingly, there will be demand for the GSE to address with the best scientific information available the actual and immediate negotiating needs of this forum.

Without such a collaborative approach, this Conference would be hard-pressed to complete a CTBT negotiating mandate satisfactorily. What was satisfactory when the GSE was effectively a substitute for political discussion in the Conference will not be satisfactory for supporting our future negotiations, or even serious pre-negotiation.

Australia consequently is prepared to accept the GSE's proposal to meet again in Geneva from 26 July to 6 August 1993 which is contained in the last or second-last paragraph of the report we will consider in a few minutes. We see this as an opportunity for significantly advancing work on seismic verification - a top priority - in accordance with the political priorities alluded to above. The meeting will also provide an opportunity for re-examination of the working relationship between the Conference and the GSE, and should result in a better-defined and more productive working partnership.

Australia has carefully considered and noted the contents of document CD/1185. We endorse the vast majority of it, and welcome the emerging technical consensus on the possible configuration of a global network of seismic stations. We particularly welcome the generous offer of the United States to provide a prototype international seismic data processing centre for use in collaborative development efforts. We also commend to other delegations the GSE's report on the GSETT-2 trial.

That said, we find it necessary to comment on a number of aspects of the report with which we are not able to agree, and which Australia believes underline the need for a closer, more sensitive, and more accountable relationship between the Conference and the Group.

The output of the GSE needs to be more readily comprehensible to the negotiating forum it serves. This affects both style and content of current reporting. Excellent science deserves excellent interpretation into the language of laymen. The intention after all is to inform a non-scientific negotiating forum. This involves providing technical answers to essentially political questions which both the subject matter itself and the negotiators raise. Equally it implies a readiness for the technical forum to ask for political guidance when formulation of technical answers requires better definition of political options under consideration.

This is a matter of common sense and intelligent interaction, both of which are entirely consistent with the GSE's mandate. However, the current culture of relations between the Conference and the GSE seems in need of some adjustment in order to realize such an objective.

Secondly, Australia was disappointed to note that what we understand to be the growing political urgency of finalizing details of a global approach to seismic verification is not reflected in CD/1185. Like other members of the Conference, we would have hoped for clear details of technical issues still outstanding, and an accounting of the firm strategies and timetables developed by the GSE in order to finalize the necessary seismic development work in a time-bound way.

In particular, we should like to know more of the costs of the options for a seismic verification network, so that we can consider more realistically States parties' obligations under a CTBT.

Thirdly, we were interested to note a number of comments in the report which appear to assume particular outcomes on questions which fall within the political negotiating authority of the Conference, where there is as yet no political agreement.

To our knowledge, contrary to the implication of paragraph 8 of CD/1185, there is no agreement in the Conference that a future verification data network for a CTBT will be restricted to "seismic" data. In the light of forthcoming discussions on non-seismic verification in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, an a priori exclusion of "non-seismic" (even if seismic-related) data seems a particularly curious and unhelpful assumption.

This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the previous report of the GSE, CD/1163 of August 1992 specifically envisaged "continuing the discussion of its future work, including the incorporation of new technologies" at the thirty-fifth session. We would appreciate reporting which reflects GSE discussion of how its ongoing work is making provision for the incorporation of the various new and non-seismic technologies which might be relevant.

Likewise, we were interested to note an assertion towards the end of paragraph 9 of the report to the effect that interpretation of any verification data will reside with individual participant States and is "not a role of the international data centre or part of the global system". Any such decision, if taken forward into a CTBT, would of course have far-reaching implications for the verification regime. It would clearly be a political rather than a technical choice. As such, it is yet to be made by negotiators.

It may be necessary for the purposes of GSE technical development work to focus on an artificially truncated version of the data network which may eventually be required by negotiators. Nevertheless, it is essential that ongoing work take account of the fact that different models, most of which involve central data processing and analysis/interpretation, are under active consideration by Conference delegations.

We consider the final CTBT outcome is much more likely to involve a central organization charged by States parties with central data processing and analysis functions. We see no reason to believe that the political and practical considerations which led negotiators to adopt this verification and compliance strategy in other multilateral arms control instruments (such as the NPT and the CWC) should be inapplicable *a priori* to a CTBT. Rather, there are clear political and practical benefits to a verification and compliance mechanism which is driven by a multilateral and therefore impartial organization capable of representing in an informed and engaged manner the interests of all States parties. I note that in any case even central processing of seismic data so as to resolve "simple" technical inconsistencies must of necessity involve exercise of some central analysis functions.

I raise these points to indicate the potential for a more productive symbiosis between the Conference and its technical advisers. At present, there is a risk of the high-quality technical seismic work not being appreciated for the major achievement which it represents, and of the Conference not gaining the full benefit of the GSE's expertise in designing a CTBT verification regime based on "good science".

On the other hand, without better contact and habits of communication between the GSE and the Conference which it serves, there is also a risk of excellent scientific resources being wastefully deployed other than in full cooperation and coordination with the thinking of negotiators.

Measures which might assist this process might include:

Revision of the format and content of the GSE's regular reporting to the Conference, and of the Conference's formal communication with the GSE (including responses to reports);

Secondly, more Conference on Disarmament delegations deciding to participate in the work of the GSE;

Thirdly, measures to be taken by individual delegations to strengthen their international policy and technical coordination (more diplomats for instance, attending GSE, and GSE delegates to attend the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and so on); and,

Finally, more regular informal but structured links between the GSE and the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he expressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, we are happy to see you presiding over today's meeting. We would like to extend a very warm welcome to the new representative of Bulgaria and we wish every success to his predecessor, Ambassador Ditchev.

On the resumption of the work of this Conference, the delegation of Mexico would like to make a brief statement on the main item on our agenda, namely, the complete prohibition of nuclear testing. During our recess there have been some important developments on this and other matters relating to nuclear disarmament.

Just a few days ago the forty-sixth World Health Assembly adopted a resolution in which it sought an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the following question: In view of its effects on health and the environment, would the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law, including the WHO Constitution?

Over the past month the annual session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission took place; at it we managed to conclude successfully a document on regional disarmament. We salute and appreciate the work of Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany as chairman of the working group concerned. The Commission was, however, unable to conclude its work on the science and technology item. Nor was there any significant progress on nuclear disarmament. It would appear that there are delegations that are much more interested in conventional or regional disarmament than in the questions related to the priority topics of the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, and most particularly nuclear weapons. Ambassador Shannon will surely have had evidence of this during his term of office as the President of this Conference on Disarmament.

During the past week some of us also attended in New York the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Conference for the review and extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT). It was evident there too that some delegations, almost all of them belonging to the group of eastern European countries and the western European and other groups, prefer a rather perfunctory, closed-door preparatory process. We on the other hand, along with the non-aligned countries, advocate a transparent preparatory process that is to say, one open to the public, to non-governmental organizations and above all to those States that are not parties but are interested in attending. Likewise, we are convinced that the 1995 NPT Conference needs very thorough preparation. For every international conference over the past few years, including last year's UNCED and the human rights conference this coming June, there has been very detailed preparation of final documents - in whose elaboration, I might add, non-governmental organizations played, precisely at the urging of the western and other countries, an important role.

A great majority of delegations to the Preparatory Committee of the 1995 Conference stressed the importance for the future of the NPT of the early conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear tests forever (a CTBT). We share the opinion that the international situation regarding this question is particularly favourable now. And we also share the view that this situation may not last long.

Three nuclear-weapon States are observing a moratorium on testing and in a fourth country there is a de facto moratorium. These moratoria have been declared unilaterally and have had a very positive impact. Their unilateral interruption would without any doubt provoke a chain reaction in other countries and we would very soon revert to the practices of the past instead of striving for a less heavily armed and therefore less insecure world. It is therefore necessary to obtain the extension of these moratoria while the multilateral negotiation of a CTBT is getting under way. In the meantime we must work intensely in the Ad Hoc Committee so determinedly chaired by Ambassador Tanaka. We await with interest the distribution announced by Sweden of a new version of its draft test-ban treaty.

My Government has followed with interest the evolution of the policies on nuclear testing of France and of the United States and Russia. It has been a very positive evolution. We welcome the French initiatives in this area. As for the United States, we are gratified by the efforts being made to achieve by 30 September 1996 a multilateral agreement for the total prohibition of these tests pursuant to the legislation adopted by Congress last year. We are convinced that the negotiation of a CTBT in a multilateral disarmament forum such as this one is the best way to attain what is one of the main goals the international community has set itself on disarmament. Among other things, it would ensure the strengthening of the regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, avoiding the emergence of further nuclear-weapon States and the continued qualitative development of the existing arsenals.

At present the new United States Administration is studying various options in this respect. In that Government there are those who advocate a nuclear test ban that would only cover the tests over one kilo ton. Others have insisted that the programme of tests contemplated by existing legislation be carried out until 1996. Finally, others have defended the thesis, which we share, that the time has come to ban all nuclear tests. The latter argue with reason that the benefits to be derived from a CTBT are very much greater than the advantages that might be obtained from a limited nuclear test programme. It is obvious that the new Administration in Washington is divided on the question. The final decision will have to be taken by President Clinton. He will have to choose between going down in history as the last post-war President to have carried out nuclear tests or the first to have stopped doing so. The choice is his.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and his kind words addressed to me.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

I give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria.

Mr. DOBREV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, the Bulgarian delegation has already conveyed its congratulations on the occasion of the Canadian presidency, but let me also, in my personal capacity, reiterate our full support to you in fulfilling the remaining part of your responsible task.

Allow me to express my sincere thanks for the kind words of welcome you and other colleagues addressed to me. It is an honour for me to participate in the work on the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral body for arms control in disarmament negotiations. My Government highly appreciates the key role the Conference on Disarmament continues to play in strengthening international peace and security.

Mr. President, I pledge to you and all my colleagues in this chamber my full cooperation and that of my delegation in promoting the work of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for his kind words to me and to my delegation.

I will now therefore turn to the issue that I announced at the beginning of the meeting. I intend now to put before the Conference for adoption the recommendation contained in paragraph 13 of the progress report on the thirty-fifth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, concerning the dates for the next session of the Ad Hoc Group, which are in fact from 26 July to 6 August. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts this recommendation.

It is so decided.

As you know consultations have proceeded to advance the plenary meeting for next week, scheduled for Thursday, 27 May, to Tuesday, 25 May. His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mr. Johan Jorgen Holst, has expressed the wish to address the Conference on that occasion. It is my understanding that members have kindly agreed to this advance of the plenary. Accordingly, we shall hold the plenary meeting next week on Tuesday, 25 May.

It is so decided.

I shall now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and may be changed if the need arises. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt the timetable.

It is so decided.

(The President)

As you know, the presidency of Canada will be concluded this week. I know that on his return Ambassador Shannon will wish to share with you his views on a number of substantive questions before the Conference. Accordingly, I will not take more of your time today. I should like, however, to express my delegation's appreciation to all the delegations participating in the work of the Conference for their assistance and cooperation during the Canadian presidency. I should also like to convey to Ambassador Hou Zhitong of China, the incoming President of the Conference, our best wishes for success in his new responsibilities, which I am sure he will discharge with wisdom because of his well-known experience and diplomatic competence. Before concluding this meeting, I would recall that, as agreed, the next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 25 May, at 10 a.m. sharp. I hope that delegations will be available at that time so as to make it possible for the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway to deliver his statement as scheduled.

This concludes our work for today and I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.

(141)

CD/PV.650
25 May 1993

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 25 May 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Hou Zhitong (China)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 650th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. At the outset I wish to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference and myself to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, His Excellency Johann Jørgen Holst, who is addressing the Conference today. The Minister assumed his functions as recently as 2 April 1993, and I am sure that members appreciate the interest he has shown in speaking to the Conference at such an early stage of his tenure. Before being appointed to his present function, His Excellency Johann Jørgen Holst was twice Minister of Defence and prior to that served first as Secretary of State in the Ministry of Defence and later in the same capacity in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was a member of the advisory council on arms control and disarmament of the Norwegian Government from 1969 until the end of the Government. He has also wide academic experience and has published a number of works on security and foreign policy. I am convinced that all of us will listen with particular interest to his statement today.

I am pleased to note the presence among us today of the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, whom I welcome cordially at this plenary meeting.

Before we proceed with the list of speakers allow me to make an opening statement on the occasion of the Chinese presidency of the Conference.

I am greatly honoured to be assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament on behalf of China. I promise the Conference that in fulfilling the duties of the President, I and my delegation will do our best to cooperate with all of you. I shall also rely on the knowledge, experience and help of all the colleagues in jointly tackling the important issues before this Conference.

First of all, I wish to express on behalf of the Conference and myself our gratitude to my predecessor, Mr. Gerald Shannon, the distinguished Ambassador of Canada, and our appreciation of his able guidance under which the Conference on Disarmament has registered further progress. He has provided me with fresh experience. I would also like to join my predecessor in welcoming warmly in our midst the new representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Dobrev. I am also very happy to have the opportunity to have close cooperation with the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and personal representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, whose remarkable diplomatic skill and whose capable team are undoubtedly an indispensable guarantee for the smooth work of the CD.

Distinguished delegates, I am pleased to inform you that on my assumption of the presidency I have just received a message to the Conference on Disarmament from Mr. Qian Qichen, Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister of the Chinese Government. I shall now read out his message:

"On the opening of the second part of the 1993 annual session of the Conference on Disarmament and on China's assumption of the presidency

of the Conference, I wish on behalf of the Chinese Government to extend our warm congratulations and cordial greetings to all these distinguished representatives.

"The world today is at an historic juncture of momentous change. With the disintegration of the bipolar structure and the end of the cold war and the confrontation between the two military blocs, the world is moving towards multipolarity. Against such a backdrop the world situation remains complex and fluid as various contradictions and disputes grow, some even escalating into armed conflict and regional wars. There are still threats to international peace and security. Disarmament is as important as ever.

"As the sole multilateral negotiating body, the Conference has made unremitting efforts for and a positive contribution to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international peace and security, as evidenced by the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Today the Conference is faced with new opportunities and challenges and carries the high hopes of the international community. It is, therefore, necessary to strengthen the Conference further and address the urgent issues confronting it, including the expansion of its membership, so as to tap the tremendous potential and give full play to the important goals of the CD.

"The Chinese Government pursues unswervingly an independent foreign policy of peace whose fundamental objective is the maintenance of international peace and the promotion of economic development. China has always opposed the arms race and supported the early attainment of the goals of disarmament set forth in relevant resolutions and documents. China has taken a series of major steps on her own initiative and contributed her due. In the prevention of nuclear war and the provision of security assurances, for example, the Chinese Government early took the lead in unilaterally undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances, and unconditionally guaranteeing not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. Meanwhile, China has also proposed the conclusion of an international convention to this effect which, China believes, will be a major contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The Chinese Government takes a positive view of, and attaches great importance to, the goals of the Conference, and has all along participated in this work actively and constructively. In future, China will continue to work with other participating States of the Conference in an effort to strengthen further the role of the Conference and to make a new contribution to the maintenance of peace and the promotion of development. May the Conference on Disarmament achieve new success."

(The President)

Distinguished delegates, just as some of my predecessors have said, the President of this Conference should realize that he is duty-bound to function in an unbiased and balanced way. In the meantime, this does not prevent him from expressing the positions of his own Government. You can be assured that I will follow this practice, strictly observing the rules of procedure of the Conference.

May I point out with pleasure and appreciation that, thanks to the effective leadership of distinguished Ambassador Amorim of Brazil and Mr. Deyanov of Bulgaria, the CD made considerable headway during its first session, thus laying a sound foundation for the whole year. The Conference reached an understanding on its 1993 agenda and agreed, without prejudice to any further decisions on the organizational framework of other items, to begin work immediately on four items: ad hoc committees were established on these items and substantive work began quite soon. In addition, the Conference adopted two reports: the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", and a report on the ongoing review of the agenda, composition and methods of work of the Conference.

I am also gratified to note that the Conference has appointed distinguished Ambassador Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico and Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia as special coordinators for the issues of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, the agenda and the membership of the Conference. These are questions of importance. So far more than 30 States have formally applied for CD membership. This not only reflects the great attention and expectation the international community places on the CD but also shows it is urgent to seek a solution to the enlargement of the CD membership. Furthermore Ambassador Marín Bosch also presides over the consultations on the non-proliferation issue. I am sure that with their diplomatic experience and their dedication to their work the distinguished Ambassadors will make further contributions to the smooth settlement of these questions.

"Nuclear test ban" is one of the important items on the agenda of the Conference and has the attention of many delegations. Fully understanding the urgent demand of all the non-nuclear-weapon States for a nuclear test ban, China has also adopted a very prudent attitude of self-restraint towards nuclear tests and sincerely hopes to see the issue solved within the framework of complete nuclear disarmament. We are pleased to note that this year the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban was established at an early date and that it has begun its work quite expeditiously under the leadership of its distinguished chairman, Ambassador Tanaka of Japan. China will as in the past take part in the Ad Hoc Committee in a constructive spirit, and wishes it progress in its work.

"Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" is another important agenda item of the Conference. Although the CD has given this issue many years' consideration, no satisfactory results have been achieved so far.

With the guidance of distinguished Ambassador Neagu of Romania, we believe the NSA ad hoc committee will make progress in this work. Non-nuclear-weapon States far and wide, whilst striving for and contributing to the promotion of nuclear disarmament and the maintenance of world peace, request that the nuclear-weapon States offer them security assurances. China considers this very reasonable, and we give our full support and unilateral assurances. The principled position and positive attitude of the Chinese Government on this issue are shown in the message from Mr. Qian, Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister of China.

The CD this year for the first time set up an ad hoc committee on the issue of transparency in armaments which is chaired by His Excellency, Mr. Zahran, Ambassador of Egypt; we appreciate the efforts made by the Chairman and wish him success. China joined the consensus on the relevant resolution of the General Assembly and actively participates in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. Appropriate and practicable TIA measures would be conducive to international confidence-building, the relaxation of tension and establishment of reasonable levels of armaments for all States. The purpose of practising TIA should be to enhance peace, security and stability of all countries, regions and the world. China has put forward its positions on this issue in a working paper. We wish to work with other delegations to produce results acceptable to all.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has already begun its work under the guidance of distinguished Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany. China holds the view that it is of certain positive significance for the Ad Hoc Committee to discuss confidence-building measures; at the same time, it is important genuinely to realize the objectives of preventing an arms race in outer space prohibiting all kinds of space weapons, realizing the non-weaponization of outer space and banning the use of force and acts of hostility in outer space etc. We hope that progress can be made in all these respects, and that an international agreement acceptable to all can be reached which, undoubtedly, will be universally welcomed.

Given the new situation in the world, the international community is confronted with ever more urgent tasks for furthering the progress of disarmament and strengthening international peace and security. Our Conference on Disarmament is also facing new challenges and opportunities. The conclusion of the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention shows once again the great potential and vitality of the CD. Let us continue our cooperation further so as to enable this sole international multilateral disarmament negotiating body to play a greater role and make even more contributions. I thank you all. That concludes my opening statement.

I now invite the speakers for this plenary meeting to make statements. On the list after the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway are the representatives of Indonesia, Senegal and Canada.

I now give the floor to Mr. Johann Jørgen Holst, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway.

Mr. HOLST (Norway): Mr. President, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, may I first of all congratulate you, Ambassador Hou Zhitong, on your assumption of the important function as President of the Conference on Disarmament. In this period of dramatic global political change, it will indeed take courage and wisdom to steer the Conference in such a way that it can continue to serve the aspirations of the world community, and it is indeed an honour and a privilege to be able to address you here today. You are all engaged in one of the essential tasks of our time. My country supports this task and seeks close association therewith.

My point of departure is that the end of the cold war does not obviate the need for arms control and disarmament, regionally or globally. On the contrary, it is my contention that the need and opportunities will grow. It is also my contention that the agenda of arms control ought to change as the overriding East-West division has given way to a more complex and differentiated set of security problems and challenges.

We no longer confront the need to stabilize a relation of nuclear confrontation, to remove, as it were, incentives for early action and temptations to capitalize on perceived advantages of striking first as well as sources of potential accidents. Stability has become a more complex and variegated objective as it has to be pursued in a variety of specific regional contexts. Nevertheless, the end of the cold war will also enhance the prospects and increase the needs for global instruments and regulations. General rules, norms and standards increasingly must replace the regulatory functions and implications of the former East-West system of mutual deterrence.

Future basic aims and purposes of arms control and disarmament in our view remain: (1) to reduce the chance of war; (2) to reduce destruction in the event of war; (3) to facilitate the early termination of war; (4) to build international security through cooperative rather than competitive undertakings; and (5) simply to save money.

To complicate matters, the end of the cold war has added five major new challenges: firstly, to combat and prevent environmental pollution, particularly nuclear pollution, as a result of former military activity and as a direct consequence of comprehensive disarmament. It should be noted in this connection that implementation of disarmament agreements could be very expensive indeed. It will also require international assistance and cooperation. Thus those agreements act also as stimulus to the growth of an ethos of common security; secondly, to dismantle the mental and physical remnants of a former confrontation; third, to prevent social dislocations which may threaten democratic stability as a result of large-scale build-down of military establishments; fourth, to foster mechanisms and procedures for war prevention, crisis management, peace-keeping and peace enforcement, and fifth, to facilitate and promote peaceful change through community-building in order to contain and constrain the growth of ethnic nationalism.

A renewed effort should now be devoted to implementing a global agenda of arms control for the post-cold-war era. We need to fix and operationalize new rules, norms and standards which could stimulate the growth of a sustainable international security order. What are the basic norms which should sustain that order? I think there are five: first, commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes; second, commitment to the norm of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; third, commitment to a system of effective control designed to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missiles; fourth, commitment to instituting equitable and cooperative systems for managing the transfer of sensitive technologies; and fifth, guidelines in regard to the transfer of conventional weapons in order to prevent local arms races, instability and aggression.

The Conference on Disarmament is the principal custodian of the aspirations and interests of the world community in the field of disarmament. In order to assess achievements and future directions, we should remind ourselves of the original order of priority in regard to global disarmament negotiations. Do you remember it? Nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons; and the reduction of armed forces. Now, the priorities were established against the background of the cold-war arms build-up, particularly on nuclear weapons. The priorities remain, but the nature of the challenges and the potential solutions have changed.

In taking stock of achievements in disarmament and arms control since 1978, we should derive encouragement from recent developments:

> The nuclear threat has receded dramatically. When implemented, the START I and II agreements will reduce drastically the levels of strategic nuclear arms. Through preferential reduction and elimination of destabilizing systems, they will institute a system of substantially lowered threats, and where nuclear weapons constitute weapons of last resort. The

INF Treaty led to the destruction of a whole class of nuclear weapons. Other categories of nuclear weapons in Europe, such as short-range nuclear ground-based missiles, nuclear artillery munitions, nuclear air defence and demolition systems, have been removed unilaterally. All nuclear weapons have been removed from naval vessels, except dedicated strategic submarines, during normal peacetime operations;

The Chemical Weapons Convention should enter into force at the earliest possible stage. Norway intends to conclude the ratification process before the summer recess of our Parliament. As we move closer to the entry into force of the Convention, the problems related to its implementation are becoming more manifest. We note with concern the political and economic difficulties faced by key signatory States in this regard. Broad international efforts are needed to implement the provisions of the Convention. Norway is ready to play her part in such a joint effort. Most particularly, we are prepared to assist in the timely and safe destruction of chemical weapons in areas in the vicinity of our

own territory. The Chemical Weapons Convention, which constitutes a tremendous triumph for the negotiating effort, skill and perseverance of the Conference on Disarmament, promises to eliminate a whole category of weapons of mass destruction;

In the area of conventional armaments, the CFE Treaty promises to bring down the levels of conventional armaments in the European region, and to stabilize the situation in former forward areas through the preferential reduction and withdrawal of heavy weapons needed for surprise attack. In addition to the direct effects of the Treaty, the end of the cold war and the political transformation of Europe have led to a general reduction of military expenditures and armaments in the northern hemisphere;

A comprehensive system of confidence- and security-building measures has been put in place and into operation in Europe. It contributes to transparency, predictability and crisis management. The CSCE process constitutes an example which, properly adopted, could enhance security and cooperation also in other regions.

These are, it seems to me, substantial achievements. However, as I have already noted, implementation of the agreements will take time, require extensive cooperation, pose new challenges, and could introduce new sources of conflict and instability if they are not carefully monitored and managed.

The two START treaties must be implemented with vigour and without delay. Ratification and implementation of the treaties are essential in order to maintain the integrity of the START process and of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as cornerstones of international security. Norway calls on Ukraine to ratify

START I and to allow for its provisions to be fully implemented and for START II to be ratified and implemented. We urge Ukraine and Kazakhstan to accede without delay and prior conditions to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States in accordance with the Lisbon Protocol.

The end of the cold war has paved the way for a new international consensus on major security issues. The Conference on Disarmament will have a vital role to play in that noble and important endeavour by building on recent achievements and developing a new agenda for the post-cold-war era.

I have already indicated what I think will be some of the key challenges. Let me just reiterate some principal perspectives:

> Our future security agenda is more complex than ever before. The need for a global approach has assumed a new urgency. The prospects of success have also been enhanced by a new and growing global consensus;
>
> Future security depends on a mix of regional and global initiatives and measures. This Conference remains the main custodian of the global part of that equation;

> Arms control and disarmament will continue to play a significant role in our quest for greater security and stability. In an interdependent world it is compellingly needed for global institutions to play a growing role. We need to stimulate a major return to multilateralism also in the field of disarmament in order to enhance minimum world order and reasonable governance.

We believe that the Conference on Disarmament has benefited from the participation of active observers, and that an expansion of the CD would not make the Conference less efficient as a negotiating body. On the contrary, bringing in new members would at this juncture mark the beginning of a new chapter in the work of the Conference as it embarks on the task of constructing the infrastructure of an equitable and robust new international security order. A certain expansion would lend both legitimacy and credibility to that new dedication.

In our view, an expansion of the Conference on Disarmament should not be postponed further. Norway applied for membership in 1982, and has been the endorsed Western candidate since 1984. I can confirm that Norway maintains her interest in membership and stands ready to provide the necessary back-up in terms of resources which full membership would entail.

Since 1981 Norway has been an observer to the Conference on Disarmament and participated in all its subsidiary bodies. Norwegian spokesmen have contributed on a regular basis to the general debate, thereby underlining the political significance which we attach to the work of this Conference. We have attempted also to contribute our views in other ways, such as through working documents.

In connection with Norway's participation in the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1981 initiated a research programme on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. As a result of this programme, working documents have been introduced in the Conference on Disarmament on an annual basis.

Norway has hosted a number of international seminars and conferences on disarmament matters, including a symposium on the Chemical Weapons Convention for representatives of CD delegations in Oslo in May 1987. An international seminar on non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapons will be held in Oslo in December 1993.

In the area of seismic verification, over the years Norway has devoted considerable resources to seismological research relevant to a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The operation of the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) and the associated research activities form key elements in these efforts. Norway has introduced several working documents reflecting the main results from this programme.

Our national expertise in the field of seismological verification of a test-ban treaty has been built up around the NORSAR facilities. The research at NORSAR has focused on the development of techniques for detecting, locating and identifying small seismic events, using very sensitive high-frequency arrays. The important role of arrays in a global network has been demonstrated. There is consensus in the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) that such arrays should form a backbone of any future monitoring system.

We note with satisfaction that the GSE is preparing to conduct global tests of a revised system of a comprehensive test-ban treaty monitoring within two years (GSETT 3). Through NORSAR Norway is prepared to take an active part in this work. This summer we will celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the agreement between the United States of America and Norway establishing NORSAR. The Norwegian Government is proud indeed of the valuable work performed by NORSAR during this quarter of a century.

For Norway, a comprehensive nuclear test ban remains an objective of the highest priority. The unilateral moratoria on testing now in force for a majority of the nuclear-weapon States are most welcome. They also provide a historic opportunity which we must not fail to seize. We are indeed heartened by the Clinton-Yeltsin declaration from Vancouver in which the two presidents agreed to commence negotiations on a comprehensive multilateral nuclear test ban at an early date. We also support the French proposal for consultations among the five nuclear-weapon States on the nuclear-test-ban issue.

The nuclear-weapon States carry the main responsibility for concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Negotiations should commence at an early date and proceed in parallel with the preparations for the NPT Review Conference. Such parallelism would greatly facilitate the preparatory work and contribute to a successful outcome of the 1995 conference. Indeed, I am genuinely worried that failure to produce such parallelism and to negotiate with urgency and in good faith for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty could put the whole NPT Conference in serious jeopardy.

Let me list very briefly the reasons why we attach such great symbolic and substantive importance to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty:

(1) It symbolizes the end of the nuclear arms race which shaped and distorted international relations during the period of the cold war. Nuclear weapons of course, do not lend themselves to disinvention but they may be reduced, dismantled and destroyed, and their further development stopped;

(2) It projects a much reduced role for nuclear weapons in national and international security strategies, thus reducing incentives for proliferation;

(3) It constitutes a necessary and reasonable quid pro quo of the nuclear-weapon States for general commitment to a viable and equitable non-proliferation regime;

(4) It provides a concrete basis for cooperative undertakings among the nuclear-weapon States, thereby deepening and broadening the emerging great-Power consensus;

And finally, (5) it provides additional insurance against nuclear pollution of the environment. We have numerous examples of venting of radioactive debris following underground tests. My country is particularly concerned on this score, since the only remaining Russian nuclear test site is at Novaya Zemlya, very close to Norwegian territory and in an ocean area with a fragile ecology of enormous importance for the harvesting of major fish stocks.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban is possible. The problem of verification can be solved. The basis for a comprehensive-test-ban-treaty verification system presumably would be a global monitoring network of sensitive seismic stations. Such a system should make use of the most recent technological advances and also incorporate high-quality stations of the array type. On-site challenge inspection, use of satellite imagery, measurement of airborne radionuclides and other supplementary verification measures can also be envisaged. Problems of verification no longer constitute legitimate obstacles.

Over the years many reasons have been put forward in favour of continued nuclear testing. The alleged need to ensure confidence in the nuclear stockpile and to improve the safety and security of nuclear weapons are now the main arguments against the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Reduced numbers of warheads contribute to enhanced overall safety and control. Older weapons should be destroyed first, leaving the safest and most secure warheads in the stockpiles. Elimination of the need for high-readiness responses allows nuclear weapons to be stored and secured in the safest way. Weapons may be retrofitted with advanced permissive action links, etc. Warheads may be re-manufactured to original specifications if problems arise or according to agreed schedules. There is now fairly broad agreement among experts that the relevant problems can be solved by programmes of stockpile inspection and non-nuclear tests.

In the past, the principal argument for nuclear testing was the development of new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons. This argument is no longer compelling. The perceived necessity of developing new warheads was often justified by the objective of strengthening deterrence and preventing unilateral advantages from accruing to the adversary in the nuclear arms race. Such perspectives no long animate or should be permitted to animate policy-making and outlooks in the post-cold-war era.

The outcome of the next NPT Review Conference in 1995 is of utmost importance. I am happy to note that the preparatory process initiated in New York earlier this month is off to a good start. Norway will continue to work for universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance with its provisions. The Treaty should be further strengthened and remain in force indefinitely. The NPT is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to prevent proliferation. It has to form the centre-piece in a broad cooperative regime of nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States designed to prevent nuclear proliferation, strengthen the non-proliferation effort and incentives, and institute a credible and effective system of sanctions and rewards.

Norway deeply regrets the announced intention by North Korea to withdraw from the NPT. Such a step would constitute a threat to regional as well as to international stability. We have urged the Government in that country bilaterally and in the United Nations to change its decision. We therefore welcome United Nations Security Council resolution 825 concerning North Korea's intention to withdraw from the NPT. This resolution demonstrates that the international community is dedicated to making every effort to convince North Korea to reaffirm its commitment to the NPT and to comply fully with the safeguard obligations it has entered into with the IAEA. Treaties must be observed and adhered to.

May I, in conclusion, return to the issue of nuclear testing. Continued nuclear tests provide a particular focus on radiation risks. Public opinion in northern Europe, and in my country in particular, is increasingly concerned about the danger of radiation from nuclear waste in adjacent waters or on land, from nuclear accidents, or from accidental venting from nuclear tests. There is also the danger that nuclear tests could destabilize nuclear waste that has been dumped in areas surrounding the test site.

Ours are times of both opportunity and danger. Let us therefore, seize the opportunity to combat and reduce the dangers produced by arms. The Conference on Disarmament provides the instrument to make possible that which is necessary.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway for his important statement and for the kind remarks he addressed to me.

I now invite Ambassador Brotodiningrat of Indonesia to make a statement.

Mr. BROTODININGRAT (Indonesia): Mr. President, on behalf of the Indonesian delegation, please allow me, at the outset, to congratulate you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Knowing your personal qualities, I am fully confident that at this second session the Conference will further advance its work on the items identified during the first session, namely: the nuclear test ban, prevention of the arms race in outer space, negative security assurances and transparency in armaments. I would also like to sincerely thank Ambassador Amorim of Brazil, Mr. Deyanov of Bulgaria and Ambassador Shannon of Canada for the most efficient and exemplary manner with which they successively presided over our previous meetings. May I seize this occasion to join you in paying tribute to the Foreign Minister of Norway, H.E. Mr. Johann Jørgen Holst, whose address will certainly be a great source of inspiration to the Conference in its current and future deliberations. Finally, I wish also to avail myself of this opportunity to welcome our new colleague, Ambassador Dobrev of Bulgaria.

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

In my intervention today I would like to confine myself to a few points in the light of recent developments, in particular those related to the strengthening and extension of the regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard being a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Indonesia has always been and will continue to be committed to the letter and spirit of the Treaty and always stands ready to join any efforts in promoting the full implementation of the Treaty. Therefore my delegation fully shares the view expressed by a number of colleagues who have spoken during the last plenary sessions of the Conference on Disarmament, asserting that the Non-Proliferation Treaty - with 157 States adhering to it - is so far the most widely-supported arms-control treaty in existence. The successful implementation of this treaty in the midst of the adverse situation created by some of the worst moments in the world's recent history, whereby nuclear war was often seen as an imminent possibility, represents in my view another testimony to the remarkable accomplishment of the Treaty.

Without belittling those successes, it would nevertheless be less than candid on our part not to point out that the long-overdue fulfilment of obligations under the Treaty by a number of States parties have always raised considerable concerns amongst the majority of States parties advocating the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Treaty ever since it came into force. Such unfulfilled obligations as those relating to article VI and preambular paragraphs 9 and 11 on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, as well as the unsatisfactory implementation of article IV on the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, have become the bone of contention between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, thus eroding the authority of the Treaty.

Being a non-nuclear-weapon State which has fully and faithfully observed all obligations under the Treaty, Indonesia is consistently opposed to any action leading toward the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Inasmuch as we respect the relevant international authority, we also expect other States parties to do exactly the same. However, the most recent event in this regard has also taught us a useful lesson as to how the shortcomings and inconsistencies in the implementation of the Treaty have made a clear-cut issue of compliance exceedingly complicated to address. Another important lesson that could be drawn from our own national and sub-regional perspective is the added relevance of our idea on the nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia, in keeping with article VII of the NPT.

After two decades, and with the fundamental changes in the international political scene culminating in the collapse of super-Power rivalry and bloc politics, the world looks totally different today from what it was in 1970, when the NPT came into force. The new realities and challenges generated by these political re-alignments have to be accommodated and further regenerated as a momentum for urgently overcoming the weaknesses in the implementation of the Treaty and thus strengthening the credibility of the NPT as a trustworthy non-proliferation regime to which we all aspire. In this regard, it is our considered opinion that the credibility of the NPT can be judged mainly from whether the letter and spirit of the provisions which are fundamental to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, as enshrined in articles I, II, IV, VI and VII, have been fully respected by all States parties.

It is indeed a source of satisfaction for us to see that, through the implementation of the obligations as stipulated in articles I and II of the NPT, to date we are capable of restricting the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the States parties and formally limiting the nuclear-weapon States to five only. In this respect, we are very much encouraged by the recent decisions taken by France and China to join the NPT. With all five formal nuclear-weapon States on board, my delegation sincerely hopes that articles I and II can be fully implemented, thereby effectively preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, we continue to be disturbed by a series of reports concerning nuclear-weapon States who, instead of devoting themselves to the promotion to the full extent of the exchange of equipment, materials as well as scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and of cooperation among States parties, were busily engaged in helping non-State parties to develop their nuclear programmes, which could lead to nuclear-weapons capabilities. In so doing they are certainly failing to live up to their commitments as subscribed under articles I and IV of the NPT. Furthermore, we continue to note with deep concern the inconsistencies in the measures taken against real and potential violators. This double-standard approach has long been criticized and has generated resentment among the non-States parties who fully abide by their obligations under the Treaty. It is high time for us to redress such unjust practices.

My delegation has on many occasions expressed its satisfaction at seeing the most powerful nuclear-weapon States, namely the United States of America and the Russian Federation, engaged in serious negotiations to reduce their nuclear weapons arsenals and succeed in concluding such important treaties as START I and, more recently, START II. While affirming that the conclusion of these two treaties will certainly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in this post-cold-war era, my delegation sincerely hopes that their implementation will take place in line with the spirit of article VI of the NPT. We would like to stress this point because, according to our rough calculation, even after the second phase of START II has been completed in the year 2003, the two parties will still possess nuclear arsenals which are quantitatively bigger and qualitatively better than they possessed in 1970, when the NPT entered into force.

Finally, considering the fact that the fundamental objectives of the NPT have yet to be achieved, we find it imperative that in the preparations for the 1995 NPT conference we begin to launch vigorous efforts to improve the implementation of the Treaty in order to ensure its effectiveness, and hence its future beyond 1995. In this context, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, including my own, have on many occasions urged all nuclear-weapon States to honour their commitments under the Treaty in good faith in order to achieve, inter alia, nuclear disarmament at the earliest

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

possible date. As a starting point, my delegation wishes to suggest converting the temporary moratorium on nuclear testing, which the majority of the nuclear-weapon States have so far observed, into a permanent one. Hopefully before the 1995 NPT conference, we shall already be able to gradually develop it into a legally binding agreement in the form of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). My delegation believes that the establishment of a CTBT before the 1995 NPT conference will help ensure the future of the Treaty beyond 1995.

Before concluding, please allow me to say a few words on the forthcoming 1995 NPT conference. While being aware that article X, paragraph 2, of the NPT speaks only of deciding whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods, nevertheless, I venture, by virtue of article VIII, paragraph 3, to suggest that, before taking any decision on the extension of the Treaty, we would do better to seize the opportunity provided by the Conference in order to seriously examine the extent to which the fundamental objectives of the NPT - namely the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament - have been effectively achieved. Only on the basis of the results of such an overall review shall we be able to clearly determine whether the NPT merits to be extended indefinitely or for an additional fixed period or periods.

In conclusion, without in any way advocating duplication of the exercise already conducted elsewhere, my delegation wishes to underline the importance of the understanding reached at the beginning of the 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament to the effect that informal consultations on non-proliferation issues be conducted under the aegis of the Conference on Disarmament, which, hopefully, will facilitate the work done more formally within the framework of the preparatory process for the 1995 Review Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and his kind words to the Chair.

I now invite Ambassador Sene, the representative of Senegal to make a statement.

Mr. SENE (Senegal) (translated from French): Mr. President, on this symbolic day, that of the thirtieth anniversary of the Organization for African Unity, allow me first of all to say how pleased we are at seeing the delegation of China, a country which has great weight in world affairs, accede to the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation would like to convey to you its heartfelt congratulations upon your election to this high office and assure you of its full support in the search for solutions to the urgent problems of disarmament. I am convinced that, in the crucial transitional period through which the Conference is going, your skill and experience will prove valuable aids in the discharge of your mandate.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

I should also like to express my gratitude to your predecessor the Ambassador of Canada, Mr. Gerald Shannon, whose enlightened leadership greatly facilitated our work. I should also like to address my warmest wishes to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui, who is, as it were, the memory and spirit of this body.

I should also like to pay tribute here to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mr. Johann Jørgen Holst, for his country's eminent contribution to disarmament efforts and for a brilliant statement that was eloquent illustration of Norway's praiseworthy choice.

Lastly, I would like to thank my friend, Ambassador Soemadi Brotodiningrat of Indonesia, for his altogether remarkable analysis of how the Non-Proliferation Treaty could be better implemented.

In the post-cold-war era significant advances have been achieved in the areas of arms control and disarmament. In this respect it is noteworthy that numerous bilateral, regional and international agreements have been concluded and measures have been taken to strengthen international security. In this context, suffice it to mention the unprecedented success of the international community's efforts to negotiate the Convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons which almost 140 States signed in Paris in January 1993. My country has also followed with interest the progress in regarding the reduction of nuclear weapons made in recent years between the United States and the Russian Federation.

Disarmament agreements, it is true, always take quite a long time to put into effect because of their complexity and the financial and technological resources they entail. In the case of the START II treaty, for example complete implementation is scheduled for the year 2003, and the Chemical Weapons Convention provides for a period of ten years for the destruction of existing arsenals, although it does, fortunately, have provisions to prevent proliferation during the period of transition towards a world free of chemical weapons. But what of the Earth, of the men, women and children who inhabit the planet and who can no longer bear the burden of the production and then the destruction of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons, the procedures for which entail considerable investment if the weapons are to be eliminated without harming the environment. And, on the subject of nuclear weapons, it would be more reassuring to exchange data on quantities of fissionable material released during destruction of armaments in the context of the reduction of nuclear arsenals and information concerning their places of storage. Clearly, while we need to be realistic and pragmatic, the emphasis must, in the final analysis, be on the necessity of negotiations on a convention providing, like that on chemical weapons, for the prohibition of all production, and the destruction of existing stocks of nuclear weapons.

I would like to go back to an event which was referred to here by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. Miguel Marín Bosch, and remind you that during the forty-sixth World Health Assembly there was abundant and lengthy discussion of the effects of a nuclear war on health and the environment. The aim was to decide whether use of such a weapon by a

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

State was not a violation of international law, including a violation of the WHO Constitution. The resolution that was adopted calls for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on this matter. The problem is certainly important, even in a post-cold-war period, and everyone agrees with the conclusions reached by the scientific experts who submitted an unequivocal report to WHO on the effects of a nuclear war on human health, on the air, on water, on soil, in short, on the entire economic and production fabric, not to mention the consequences of a "nuclear winter". It is true, too, that an advisory opinion, even though not binding, always carries moral and political weight. Nevertheless, the fundamental question, in our view, is how can we prevent a nuclear war, or how can we achieve general disarmament as in the case of chemical weapons. It is in that direction that we should direct our energies, but these questions must be discussed in the Conference on Disarmament and not in WHO. We must bear in mind this need for consensus and this wisdom at the next World Health Assembly in order to avoid confrontation and the succession of secret ballots which took so much time. It would help us avoid misunderstandings too.

What we could have talked about at WHO, however, was the increasingly common threat of incidents - even if they are termed "minor incidents" - at poorly maintained nuclear power plants, with the risk of accidental release of radioactive substances as happened at Chernobyl. At any rate, alerts have become frequent and we should take this as a warning. Just last week there was an alert. Nor did we talk at WHO about the difficulties of destroying nuclear weapons in the framework of disarmament agreements and the need to preserve the environment.

In the meantime, let's go back to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT, which, as my colleague reminded us a moment ago, is an indispensable instrument for international peace and security as well as for the social and economic well-being of peoples. Because it effectively bars the dissemination of nuclear weapons and provides a framework for general disarmament. Moreover, the NPT has verification machinery, thanks to the IAEA safeguards system, but still permits trade and international cooperation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

It is noteworthy, that, since the fourth Review Conference, in 1990, the number of States parties to the NPT has grown by 16 additional members and now includes all the nuclear-weapon States - at least, as they are defined in the Treaty itself. In all, 156 countries are parties to the NPT and there remain more than 30 States which have not yet acceded to it, even though some of them engage in nuclear activities. At any rate, South Africa, which was suspected of having a nuclear capability has admitted the fact and has joined the NPT. We hope that it will submit all its nuclear facilities to IAEA monitoring. At the very least, this is a positive development which creates favourable conditions for the establishment in Africa of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. I call upon nuclear-weapon States to support Africans to that end.

However, in view of certain shortcomings and inadequacies, can we believe that IAEA has all the human, financial and technical resources necessary to assume its crucial role in the field of monitoring of nuclear facilities?

In other words, is IAEA properly equipped to discharge its international legal responsibilities as regards the application of safeguards at a time when significant discoveries are being made regarding the nuclear fuel cycle? The answer lies in the question. More precisely, we believe that an efficient, functional verification system is a fundamental requirement for the NPT. So all progress in the area of expertise and competence regarding verification will be of incalculable value for international non-proliferation efforts. In fine, no better service could be rendered to the worldwide credibility and authority of the NPT than to strengthen the verification machinery of the IAEA and execute the provisions of article VI of the Treaty properly. In addition, the NPT would benefit from genuine advances if things opened up as regards the total prohibition of nuclear tests, the provision of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and the banning of attacks against nuclear facilities. It is quite clear that the need to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban has become a crucial issue connected with the NPT and with nuclear disarmament in general. My delegation considers that it is because of all these factors that we must prepare for the forthcoming NPT Review Conference in 1995 in the certainty that the Treaty, which is indispensable in all respects, must remain in force indefinitely.

Therefore the nuclear-weapon States that have declared a moratorium on nuclear testing and those that have not yet done so should take the opportunity to commence negotiating a verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. Our aim is to establish a system for controlling the proliferation not only of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, but also of long-range delivery vehicles and dual-capability technologies. In any event, verification measures should be balanced and equitable, and to be effective they should not impede the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes.

Naturally, Senegal, which attaches priority to the question of weapons of mass destruction, ascribes just as much importance to the control of conventional weapons. The distressing events occurring in various parts of the world, notably Africa, demonstrate in the clearest possible manner the consequences of unbridled and excessive accumulation of conventional weapons, how it aggravates local and regional conflicts. That is why, in his report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", (document A/C.1/47/7), the United Nations Secretary-General has underscored that transparency can be conducive to confidence-building among States and eliminating risks of suspicion, misunderstanding, tension or threats of war. In that connection the Register of Conventional Weapons established by the United Nations in accordance with General Assembly resolution 46/36/L should help to create conditions of transparency and confidence, responsibility and stability for the strengthening of regional and international peace and security. Essentially the Register should institute an international code of conduct for the purposes of controlling arms transfers and the activities of weapons suppliers and dealers in accordance with universally applicable rules and standards. It is also a question of putting an end to the nefarious effects of the illicit

arms trade connected with the vicious cycle of terrorism, drug trafficking and smuggling engaged in by irregular groups that are destabilizing modern societies.

It is to be hoped that, after four decades of the arms race, we are moving towards the demilitarization of economies, the conversion of military-industrial complexes to peaceful purposes. But the end of this process is not, of course, around the corner. Still waiting in the background are the many problems connected with the close relationship which my country has always held to exist between disarmament and development. The time has perhaps come to monitor arms deals, breaking the infernal cycle of illicit exports, and to diminish their impact on the world economy in order to achieve the better, transparent management of arsenals. I am convinced that the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency under the enlightened leadership of the Ambassador of Egypt, my friend, Mounir Zahran will be able to take account of all these factors, in a global approach to these very important aspects of disarmament.

Moreover, the report of the Secretary-General, in addressing the concepts of integration, globalization and revitalization, demonstrates clearly that disarmament and arms regulation are inseparable from political and economic questions, and that security itself has manifold dimensions that are political, economic, social, cultural and ecological. This situation becomes even more meaningful in this period of democratic transition and of economic recession and the spread of unemployment and poverty throughout the world. Likewise, peace is a global and indivisible concept, which means that progress achieved in disarmament for certain categories of armaments should be extended to others.

Incontrovertibly, the success in negotiating a chemical weapons convention shows that, after the cold war, the Conference on Disarmament has entered a new era that is full of promise and hope but also full of uncertainty and risk. Because the problems to be addressed are considerable and the challenges to be met are grave. To maintain its credibility the Conference will have henceforth to pay greater attention to the new threats to world peace and security. It must become involved in the prevention of armed conflicts exacerbated by extremes of nationalism and by identity crises, ethnic and religious tensions and territorial disputes. Hence, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of conventional weapons will constitute a paramount concern of the international community in the years to come. In the final analysis, the global, long-term objective of the Conference, which is to reduce the levels of armaments and to inspire

confidence through legally binding disarmament agreements on the regional and world levels, will be decisive for the future.

It is an open secret that this objective will not be achieved overnight for this exciting enterprise, in which Senegal would like to be able to participate fully, requires the efforts and political will of all who comprise the international system. As the twentieth century draws to a close we must all endeavour to write a new page in the history of disarmament, of security and peace for the well-being of all humanity.

Of course, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament must continue to be a multilateral negotiating body, not just a deliberative organ. The Conference must keep to its method of elaborating by consensus principles and rules of conduct applicable to the world disarmament processes, with the legal and political commitment of all States to respect them. Such an approach requires a forward-looking vision of the new realities, doctrines of deterrence, appropriate strategies reflecting the fact that the world has changed radically and is now multipolar and that enlargement of the Conference on Disarmament seems to us inevitable. My country, which made its application for admission in 1982, has always participated in the Conference's work as an observer, even though it has always been said that the question of expanding the membership requires an urgent decision. We should like to say that the Conference should be open to all States that wish to join it and have always given concrete evidence of their interest, their resolve and their commitment as regards disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Senegal for his statement and his kind remarks addressed to me and my country.

I now invite Ambassador Shannon, the Representative of Canada, to make a statement.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, I was honoured to have been, as Canada's Permanent Representative in Geneva, the President of the Conference on Disarmament from March 18 to May 18 of this year. Because I was in my capital last week for consultations I was unable to be present for the last meeting of the Canadian Presidency, but I am today able both to touch briefly on four sets of issues that have been before us in the Conference, and to extend my support to you, Ambassador Hou, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Canada and China have a long and fruitful history of cooperation in multilateral fora and I look forward to working closely with you during the second session.

I also wish to take this chance to thank the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui, and his very able staff for the highly professional support to me during my tenure as President. As well, I wish to join my Indonesian and Senegal colleagues in thanking Mr. Holst of Norway for his contribution to our debate. And finally, I wish to extend my congratulations to Ambassador Sene and other colleagues from Africa on this important anniversary of the founding of the Organization of African Unity.

The preceding two months have been a busy period for all of us and have included an active work programme by all ad hoc committees. Many CD delegations were present at the three week UNDC session in New York from April 19 to May 10 and at the NPT Extension Conference Preparatory Committee from May 10-May 14. The session now before us also promises to engage us in a focused way as we address the most pressing issue before us, i.e. the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Before addressing the principal tasks before this body, I should note that the process of reform which we all seek, in the UNDC was clearly evident this year, as shown by the successful conclusion of the item on regional disarmament. The agreed report represents a global consensus that regional disarmament must be viewed in the context of international peace and security. This is starkly evident in the former Yugoslavia and in the Korean peninsula, where regional tensions can have a disruptive effect on global stability.

Equally impressive was the progress made on the item dealing with science and technology. It seems obvious to Canada from the debate on this issue that what is required is an approval on technology transfers that reflects the interests and views of both suppliers and recipients, and does so in a way that meets the twin objectives of enhancing international cooperation and promoting international security. In the Canadian view, adherence to internationally accepted non-proliferation norms is essential not only as a basis for international security but also for providing a basis for cooperation in the transfer of sensitive technology.

In my March 18 statement on assuming the presidency of the CD, I spoke of some issues of particular importance to Canada: the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the CD; the NPT, CD membership; and finally transparency in armaments. I would like to briefly take up these issues again.

Canada welcomed the commitment made by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Vancouver this year to negotiate a multilateral nuclear test ban at an early date. The place is the CD; and the time is now. Canada urges the United States of America, France and Russia to continue with moratoria on nuclear testing; and urges the United Kingdom and China to follow suit.

Nuclear testing in whatever form large or small, for safety or qualitative reasons - is in our view a vestige of a bygone era. The realization of a CTBT has long been a Canadian objective. We must seize this opportunity and summon the political will and energy to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

On verification, which is crucial to a meaningful CTBT, Canada is actively participating in the work of the group of scientific experts which is considering international cooperative efforts to detect and identify seismic events in support of a CTBT. On May 27, when the NTB ad hoc committee starts its second session's work, we will contribute a paper on non-seismic technologies which will outline two presentations Canada will be making to the Committee.

The GSE mandate has been criticized by some as being inflexible. Some say it does not allow for discussion on non-seismic technologies in support of a CTBT. However, presentation of the NTB ad hoc committee of papers on non-seismic technologies underscores the fact that other mechanisms for detection and verification can be examined under the aegis of the NTB ad hoc

committee. Ambassador Tanaka, the very able Chairman of the NTB ad hoc committee, can count on full Canadian participation in the work of his committee both at the technical and at the decision-making level.

On non-proliferation, the process of extending the NPT was begun auspiciously by the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Extension Conference in New York from May 10 to 14 and decisions were reached on such necessary procedural questions as the dates and venues of future meetings of the Preparatory Committee and of the Extension Conference itself; and on the establishment of what we regard as a very able Bureau.

As we move from process issues to substance, we will continue to need a spirit of cooperation that is based on a common appreciation of the significance and essentiality of the NPT to efforts not only to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also to contribute to their eventual complete elimination. On the latter point, Canada encourages all the nuclear Powers to make even deeper cuts in their nuclear arsenals - moves which, in addition to having their own intrinsic merit, would facilitate the attainment of our objectives with respect to non-proliferation.

Of course, we welcome the recent announcement by Belarus to ratify the NPT and we again call on Ukraine and Kazakhstan to sign the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States.

In May of last year, Canada's Prime Minister outlined a programme of action on non-proliferation for the consideration of the international community. That programme remains on the table. Stating that nothing is more important than the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the Prime Minister called on the world community to strengthen the NPT when it comes up for extension in 1995. It is Canada's view that all countries should sign it, and that it must be extended indefinitely.

We believe that real progress is being made in terms of non-proliferation. As articulated by most countries, the basic premise of the NPT is a commitment by the nuclear Powers to reduce nuclear weapons in return for a commitment by the non-nuclear Powers not to acquire these weapons. The 1995 Extension Conference must confirm that process.

I would now like to turn to CD membership, a subject which has been touched on this morning and which will continue to occupy our time this session. A number of proposals for reform of CD membership have been considered during the preceding months, but many epitomize thinking more reflective of the cold-war era than of the world we face today. In our view to leave membership as it is at present, which some advocate, would be self-serving for some, and a signal to those not at the table that the CD is not prepared to recognize realities. To expand membership only slightly would signal disregard for the democratic principles of inclusion which we all cherish.

On March 18, I set out Canada's preference for the option that would permit those countries which have formally requested to join the CD to be welcomed as full members immediately. This approach would, by our count, increase CD membership to a manageable number (between 69 and 75). Current CD membership obviously no longer reflects present geo-political realities. The changing world order is one based on democratic principles, and exclusivity is no longer acceptable. Canada also would have difficulties supporting the concept of the general United Nations family of nations being asked to continue to support financially a closed club here in Geneva.

In sum, Canada believes that the best choice among the options being addressed, would be to allow any country which formally applies by a certain date to be allowed to join the CD. I urge all current CD members to give this proposal their active consideration.

Finally, I would like to comment briefly on the work regarding transparency in armaments. The Register of Conventional Arms is now in place and Canada submitted its report by the April 30 deadline. This reflects our commitment to the Register. We would like to assume that either all CD members have submitted their voluntary data and background information to the Register, or, if they have not done so, that they plan to do so imminently.

You will recall that a group of governmental experts is due to convene in 1994 with a view to preparing for the Secretary-General at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly a report on the operation of the Register. Furthermore, this report will take into account the work of the CD as outlined in paragraphs 12 to 15 of resolution 46/36 L.

Time is marching on. If we are to meet our commitments, and make a useful contribution to the group of governmental experts, the ad hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments will need to accelerate its work.

I have touched briefly today on four key disarmament issues, the CTBT, the Non-proliferation Treaty, membership in this august body and transparency in armaments. Of course, the first two issues are of paramount importance. Unlike the NPT, however, where there is an established process in place which we hope will lead to its indefinite extension, we lack in the CD even a negotiating mandate for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

I wish to stress my Government's view that the time is ripe to act rapidly on the question of the negotiation of a CTBT. In the Canadian view, there is no better way to demonstrate the need for, and therefore the continuing relevance of the CD.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair as well as to my country.

(The President)

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the representative from the delegation of the DPRK. I wonder if you are going to make a statement on procedural matters or a statement of a substantive nature? I give the floor to the representative of the Mission of the DPRK.

Mr. CHONG (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): It is just a procedural matter.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative from the mission of the DPRK.

Mr. CHONG (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, first of all, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I did not intend to take the floor but since the Norwegian Minister mentioned our country concerning NPT, I reserve the right to take the floor at the next meeting, although the position of my Government on this issue is well known.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): Now, if there are no other delegations wishing to take the floor, I wish to turn to another subject. The secretariat has circulated today document CD/WP.443 containing a request from the Republic of Slovenia to participate in the work of the Conference in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure. I wish to note that we are taking action only in connection with the second paragraph of that communication, as the question of membership is being dealt now by the Special Coordinator appointed for that purpose. No objection has been raised in connection with the request of Slovenia to participate as a new member in our work: therefore, I take it that the request before you is acceptable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I shall inform the representative of Slovenia of the action taken by the Conference.

May I now turn to another matter. In accordance with the practice of the Conference and since there will be no plenary meeting on Thursday, I invite you to consider the timetable of the meetings to be held next week by the Conference, and its subsidiary bodies. As usual, the timetable has been prepared by the secretariat in consultation with the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies. Of course the timetable is only indicative and if necessary will be revised. On this understanding and if there is no objection, I will take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): Before adjourning the plenary meeting, I should like to record that we shall hold an informal open-ended consultation on the improved and effective function of the Conference immediately after the plenary meeting and in the same room, with interpretation services, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan.

That concludes our work for today. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 3 June 1993 at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

CD/PV.651
3 June 1993

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 3 June 1993 at 10 a.m.

President:	Mr. Hou Zhitong	(China)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 651st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. At the beginning I welcome warmly on behalf of the Conference and myself the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, His Excellency Mr. Kooijmans, who will be our first speaker today. The Minister is a well-known jurist with wide academic experience in the field of international law and he is the author of many publications dealing with important legal issues. He is also well known to the United Nations system, having chaired the Commission on Human Rights, which he regularly attends as head of the Netherlands delegation. Between 1973 and 1977 he served as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, having previously been Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Disarmament and International Security in Peace Problems. I am very happy to receive him today in our midst. We are also very pleased to welcome the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Petrovsky.

I have on my list of speakers for today His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and the representatives of Turkey, Sweden and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I am very happy to give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, His Excellency Mr. Kooijmans.

Mr. KOOIJMANS (Netherlands): Thank you, Mr. President for your kind, introductory words. It is a pleasure for me to speak today under your presidency. You represent a State with which the Netherlands has long-standing relations. Only recently I had the pleasure of conducting extensive and fruitful discussions with the deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Qian Qichen, on the occasion of his visit to The Hague. I am confident that your presidency will be successful.

May I also take this opportunity to thank the representative of Canada for the excellent manner in which he conducted the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during his tenure. Finally, I would like to pay tribute to the professionalism and steadfastness of the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, concurrently special representative of the United Nations Secretary-General.

With the end of the cold war, the risk of a nuclear exchange between East and West has diminished dramatically, thus resulting in a substantial improvement of international security. Nonetheless, three years later the picture is, frankly, not a rosy one. Crisis stability has not increased correspondingly. War is once more a reality in a part of Europe. Hardly a day passes without us seeing evidence that chaos and destruction have come upon us again. If in the past, when cold-war tensions did act as a restraining force, we were content to sit back, we now realize that nationalism, regional strife and instability have resurfaced. Such developments leave us no room for complacency.

At the same time we should not give in to pessimism. There is still reason to have confidence in international cooperation if we all engage in a search for ways and means to respond creatively and effectively to new challenges. We must not permit ourselves to regress into virulent nationalism and ethnic strife, or, to use an expression once heard, "to become one-dimensional man again". International cooperation and integration has achieved so much that it would be inconceivable to risk all that for some ephemeral, narrow political gain.

It is vital for the Conference on Disarmament to realize that, despite some leftovers from the cold war, the outlook for the 1990s in terms of progress in arms control and disarmament is more promising than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. Notwithstanding differences of opinion between members of this body on tactics, there is quite a degree of consensus on the broader strategy for achieving international peace and stability. Cooperative security efforts, if properly conceived, do stand a chance of success.

In my statement today, I wish briefly to review the broad parameters of the post-cold-war security agenda. Then I shall examine the approach required to meet the security needs of the 1990s. Finally, I would like to explore ways in which the Conference on Disarmament could fulfil its responsibilities vis-à-vis the international community.

What are the main characteristics of our present-day security environment?

First, cold-war tensions are no longer with us. Today's risks emanate from regional instability, overspilling ethnic and religious strife, and revived nationalist sentiments. The threats to international peace and security posed by non-military sources of instability were clearly recognized by the Security Council in its summit declaration of 31 January 1992. Evidently, the perception of insecurity has changed, together with the changing nature of the threats themselves. We have become aware that, in endeavouring to resolve political and military questions, the growing interrelation of economic, social and environmental issues cannot be ignored. The plight of the Kurds in Iraq and the acute humanitarian emergency in Somalia are cases in point. We realize what we are up against when we listen to some of the new vocabulary: the term "ethnic cleansing" can be heard frequently nowadays. It is very redolent of the worst excesses of racism which this century has witnessed. This is a most distressing development.

Secondly, the risk of regional or local conflicts degenerating into real threats to international security is exacerbated not only by the accumulated amounts of readily available conventional weapons all over the globe, but also by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery system. While irrevocable changes affecting relations between States in the post-cold-war era create opportunities for cooperative security in many areas of the world, old antagonisms have re-emerged and have become more dangerous. Let us by no means underestimate the dangers and convulsions which manifestly attend this process.

Finally, there is the new phenomenon which the Secretary-General of the United Nations has defined as "the failed State", meaning an entire State that collapses or risks collapsing after the withdrawal of its super-Power support. Here again new approaches, innovative and at times painful, must be developed.

The focus of our attention is changing accordingly. In the past we had to prevent the one big outburst of premeditated fire that threatened to engulf us all. But now we must cope with the danger posed by many smaller fires in various areas in the world. These fires are certainly smaller, but they are still hot, and they may spread. If we are to do something meaningful, we should set ourselves clear goals. If we are to achieve international stability, then we must define the meaning of stability.

In the view of the Netherlands, freedom and stability go hand in hand. Long-term stability is only conceivable in an environment defined by democratic political systems, free-market economies, social justice, respect for human rights, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Dealing with regional conflicts is next to impossible if one does not tackle head-on the underlying causes of conflict. In the long run, no State can afford to isolate itself completely from events taking place in other parts of the world. Brutal aggression, repression, "ethnic cleansing", whether they occur in Cambodia, the Middle East, Europe, Africa or anywhere else, inevitably affect us all, if only because they undermine stability. Stability is essential to security. And without security, there will be no rule of law and no sustained economic development.

In the Charter of the United Nations we have at our disposal an instrument that is flexible enough to be adapted to new conditions. However, it should be kept in mind that the Charter was established under an international order which was dramatically different from the one we witness today. It is to the lasting credit of the politicians of the 1940s that they drafted a document that is as valid and applicable today as it was then.

I welcome the fact that the General Assembly, for its part, has embarked on a process of reflection as regards the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery. The Secretary-General's "New Dimensions" report was a timely initiative, as was the resumed session of the First Committee earlier this year. I hope that efforts to further rationalize the work of the Committee will continue, building, inter alia, on the proposal by the member States of the European Community to streamline the agenda of the First Committee.

Our primary duty remains the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable international peace and security. Granted, insecurity today is rather different from what was meant in the past. We must cope with many unforeseen situations at the same time, like a chess-player in a multiple chess match. To cling to old ideas amounts to making oneself irrelevant.

The Security Council of the United Nations was long prevented from fulfilling its proper role in ensuring international peace and security. Fortunately, it has now taken the lead in managing the transition to a new international security order. This becomes abundantly clear from the way the Security Council deals, inter alia, with conflicts in Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. It is up to us, States Members of the United Nations, to increasingly engage in creative thinking aimed at using as efficiently as possible the mechanisms available for the management of international peace and security. Solving the underlying causes of regional conflicts is, however, a major undertaking that will require a lot of time.

At the request of the United Nations Security Council, the Secretary-General drew up his "Agenda for Peace". In this important document Mr. Boutros-Ghali presented us with his views on how to confront the challenges of our time. The Secretary-General has proposed an evolutionary shift towards peace-keeping, a concept not even mentioned in the United Nations Charter. The sheer size of peace-keeping operations is now staggering in terms of the human and financial resources involved. The nature of peace-keeping has changed as well, as it is no longer based merely on interposing United Nations forces between the warring parties after a cease-fire agreement has been obtained. Troops used to be lightly armed, for purposes of self-defence only. Today, peace-keeping implies military as well as non-military measures, involving for example cease-fire units, civilian police, electoral monitoring units and humanitarian relief.

The Netherlands Government supports this second-generation peace-keeping, including post-conflict peace-building. The Secretary-General of the United Nations recently indicated, and I agree with him, the possibility of even more far-reaching operations regarding what, as I mentioned, he calls "the failed State". In such cases, and I quote the Secretary-General: "It will require long, complex and costly missions which, by their very nature, involve the United Nations in the internal affairs of the country concerned". I would add that this may imply military action.

The risks that domestic unrest and regional instability carry for international stability and security increasingly require our attention. Most importantly, we cannot avoid addressing the internal affairs of a State or region, something which only a short while ago was still unacceptable to may States. Of course, the States of the region concerned retain a special responsibility - one could describe it as a challenge, for that matter. They must take the initiative.

Setting up new cooperative regional structures will in many cases be a long and drawn-out process, which will require sustained effort and support from the international community. To do so effectively, the economic, social, ethnic and humanitarian issues involved will have to be taken into account. Building these structures will require patience and perseverance, in other words: political stamina. There is no short-cut to political and economic justice, which are essential for peace, stability and the rule of law.

I would add that by advocating a comprehensive approach to security issues and their underlying causes, I am not implying that the operationalization of our efforts must be effected through one and the same body. A full array of readily available, specific instruments exists and we should apply them judiciously. The Conference on Disarmament is one such instrument. Negotiating international agreements has been the constitutional task of the CD and its predecessor bodies. As such, it has a proud track record. What further use should be made of the CD?

It would seem that the negotiating process in the CD should, in addition to the conclusion of a nuclear test-ban treaty, focus on codes of conduct, confidence-building measures and regimes of a similar nature. The CD may be guided in that respect by the Security Council's assessment that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. For its part, the General Assembly has set out important objectives for the arms control and disarmament agenda of the 1990s under the heading "Transparency in armaments". These two examples are an expression of the increasing consensus of opinion within the international community on what constitutes acceptable behaviour among its members. By shaping such normative values, the Security Council and the General Assembly respectively have provided criteria by which the action of all States can be evaluated.

The foregoing may help to conceptualize the way the CD should carry out the important task under its agenda item "Transparency in armaments". Next to non-proliferation with regard to weapons of mass destruction, transparency in armaments has been pushed to the forefront of our concerns. It is through conventional weapons that most suffering comes about. As such, I consider it a priority item. This "transparency" exercise in the CD should eventually make it easier to achieve proper regulation of the conventional arms trade. I take note in this respect of the interesting idea, suggested by Ireland and Poland for instance, which involved the development of an international code of conduct on arms transfers. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is an important component of "transparency in armaments". Some 50 States have now submitted data on their imports and exports of conventional arms and have, in most cases, also provided available background information. This is a most promising start indeed, although broader participation in the Register does of course remain essential. I would like to emphasize that the Register exercise should not be seen as directed against one State or the other. Its function is not to harm anyone, but to increase the security of all. The Netherlands will maintain its efforts to carry this important confidence-building initiative further.

The work of the CD under the heading of non-proliferation should, of course, take place with the highly significant 1995 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in mind. The importance of the NPT is obvious. It stands out as the most successful security-related treaty in existence, providing a universal norm for national and international behaviour. The first in a series of four Preparatory Committees for this conference was concluded in New York last month and it was chaired by my compatriot, Mr. Jan Hoekema. Through the discussion of matters of organization and substance, it paved the way for a thorough review of the way the Treaty functions and for a well-founded decision in 1995 on the duration of its extension. The Netherlands firmly believes that the NPT should continue to be in existence indefinitely and unconditionally after 1995. At the same time, we should aim at strengthening various provisions of the Treaty, including the ones on safeguards.

My Government is of the opinion that treaties concerning weapons of mass destruction and export control regimes are complementary, interlocking parts of one and the same security policy. At the same time, my Government realizes that for a lasting and effective non-proliferation policy untiring efforts should be pursued to remove the political motives behind proliferation tendencies, which unfortunately still prevail in the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula. The argument that access to technology should be guaranteed is sometimes put forward. This is precisely what my Government is trying to do. Export-control regimes should make it easier for a recipient State to acquire whatever it needs for its legitimate development. A State that strictly abides by its international non-proliferation commitments should have no reason to worry about export control regimes.

While on the subject of responsible non-proliferation behaviour, I would like to express the Netherlands' sincere hope that the high-level discussions between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (held yesterday) will lead to a reversal of the DPRK's announced intention to withdraw from the NPT and to a preparedness on its part to comply with the existing obligations under the Treaty.

At the same time, I would like to underscore the importance of the 1992 Lisbon Protocol to the START Treaty, obliging Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States parties in the shortest possible time. I welcome the fact that Belarus has fulfilled its commitment,and I urge the other two States to do likewise. In the same vein, I welcome the ratification of START I by Belarus and Kazakhstan. My Government calls upon Ukraine to ratify START I and allow for its provisions to be implemented, and thereby to pave the way for START II to be ratified and implemented.

My Government welcomes the Vancouver Summit Declaration by the Russian Federation and the United States, which holds out the prospect of further concrete nuclear arms control and disarmament measures and talks on a ban on nuclear testing. My Government looks forward to the early conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear tests. It would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and complement the nuclear disarmament process, as agreed between the Russian Federation and the United States. Eventually, all the nuclear-weapon States should be involved in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. I hope that negotiations on a nuclear test ban in the CD can begin soon. Extensive work on the seismic component of verification of a nuclear test ban has already been done. While other verification methods will also be required, I am confident that the CD will be able to work out a proper multi-faceted verification regime for a nuclear test ban.

The Netherlands Government has consistently taken an active interest in the issue of prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities. This subject should again be taken up for negotiation in the CD. I regret that this issue has, until now, divided CD members into two camps: those who seek a blanket protection for all installations and those who want nothing at all. I continue to believe that the solution to this deadlock lies somewhere in between. I find it bewildering that no progress could be made in this forum, when many of us agree that an armed attack on a nuclear installation could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked. Most CD members also agree on the need to prohibit armed attacks on nuclear installations from which such releases could occur.

By negotiating treaties with global application, the CD has been given an essential role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Its latest achievement, the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention, is by no means its most negligible. The Convention's verification provisions open up a new chapter in arms control. The Netherlands took an active part in negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention and now carries the special responsibility of hosting the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and, in the future, the OPCW itself. We will do our utmost to facilitate the work of the Preparatory Commission and the OPCW.

I have just referred to the innovative verification provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Of course, verification is always treaty-specific, while each arms control and disarmament agreement is an individual one. Still, I wonder whether the CD, while exploring avenues for codes of conduct, guidelines and regimes of a similar nature, could not examine the principles of verification drawn up by the UNDC. Related studies carried out in the meantime and practical experience gained since should, of course, be taken into account in the course of such an exercise, the results of which might eventually find a practical application in the context of various peace-building efforts around the world.

As I speak today, another exercise is going on in the Palais des Nations. I refer to the work of the Ad hoc Group of Governmental Experts tasked with the identification and examination of potential verification measures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The Netherlands recently carried out a bilateral trial inspection of a large vaccine production facility, the outcome of which appears to be quite encouraging. I look forward to the "VEREX" exercise having a positive outcome. Thorough verification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention would close another loophole in the broader regime for weapons of mass destruction. It would thus add to the security of us all.

Certain types of conventional weapons cause horrendous suffering. Their use should be prohibited or restricted. The Netherlands is a party to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, the "Cushie Weapons Convention", and its Protocols. Recently attention has once again been drawn to the indiscriminate and excessive harm inflicted by certain conventional weapons, especially upon the civilian population in areas of conflict. I refer in particular to landmines and the use of incendiary devices against civilian targets. Regrettably, too few States have become parties to the

Convention. I urge all members of the CD and other States to accede to the Convention. It is indeed high time to convene a conference to review the Convention. We hope that the States participating in that review conference will agree on ways and means to strengthen the Convention. The Netherlands stands ready to engage in consultations with all interested States parties and other States.

The radical transformation of the arms control agenda amounts to so many calls on the CD to rise to the challenge of the 1990s. In today's fast-changing world, the future relevance of the CD is commensurate with its ability to move beyond its monumental achievement of last year, the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The CD's role as the sole, autonomous multilateral negotiating forum for global arms control and disarmament is by now well established and must be preserved. The CD must seize the opportunities presented by the new global realities and priorities in the field of international security. This is not the time for splendid isolation. Instead, the CD should admit new members to its deliberations. It should do so before it decides on a new agenda, if only to give those new members the opportunity to be consulted about the subjects which concern them most. I favour a substantial, yet controlled expansion of the CD with roughly 30 States. After its expansion, the new CD should take a fresh look at its agenda, an agenda that must be flexible enough to be adapted regularly, depending on the international situation. I am confident that the CD as a collective body, will know how to translate the new imperatives of our time into its structure, working methods and agenda.

In conclusion, arms control and disarmament measures alone cannot secure the peace. Such measures must be part of a broader strategy for achieving global security, stability, and the rule of law. Undeniably, there is a growing resolve on the part of the world community to act collectively and decisively to construct a better, safer world. A network of mutually reinforcing instruments is already in place, aimed at grappling with the problems that are confronting the post-cold-war world. The Conference on Disarmament is one such instrument. As a global negotiating forum, the Conference has the potential to contribute to cooperative security and stability at lower armaments levels. In order to realize this potential, the Conference must look forward - not backward - and define its agenda for the nineteen-nineties. For its part, the Netherlands will spare no effort to help the Conference on Disarmament meet present and future challenges.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank his excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to me and my country. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Turkey, Mr. Arar.

Mr. ARAR (Turkey): Mr. President, at the outset, I would like to congratulate you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and assure you of the full support of my delegation in accomplishing your duties.

In the light of the forthcoming Review and Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, for which preparations have already begun, in my intervention today I would like to confine myself to the verification issue.

Turkey, as one of the early signatories of the NPT, has always considered it as a crucial multilateral disarmament treaty which, by reducing considerably the risk of nuclear proliferation, has made a significant contribution to international security. My country, many times in the past, called upon both nuclear and non-nuclear States to accede to the Treaty and at present continues to invite those who do not wish any more to abide by its principles to adhere to it.

However, it should be noted that the risks of proliferation of nuclear weapons have reached their peak despite all the attempts to prevent this trend and over 25 years of existence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This unsatisfactory situation, together with the hopes that we all have for the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, should compel us to initiate a serious stock-taking exercise of the experience we have had about the NPT regime.

With due respect to its virtues in promoting nuclear non-proliferation, it is now widely recognized that, mainly owing to the prevailing international conditions of the era in which this Treaty was established, the NPT suffers several shortcomings and gaps, especially concerning its monitoring and verification mechanisms. The important developments which took place in the field of arms control and disarmament since the accomplishment of the NPT, in terms of some international conventions containing detailed and intrusive verification measures, such as the Convention on Chemical Weapons, helped us to understand more clearly these deficiencies.

As a result of radical changes in international relations, important reductions in nuclear weapons are no longer out of reach in the East-West negotiations. Nevertheless, proliferation of nuclear weapons in the third world still constitutes a potential threat to international peace. One may argue that, despite the 1960s projections which indicated the emergence of 30 to 40 nuclear-capable countries, under the NPT regime the number of countries suspected of having acquired nuclear capabilities seems to have been confined to around 10. We cannot accept this outcome as a consolation. We consider this as a proof of the fact that, in spite of being parties to the NPT as non-nuclear States, some countries have been able to obtain nuclear-weapons production capabilities and some of them could actually reach the point of possessing them. This we consider as a situation which cannot be allowed to continue if the NPT is to be extended indefinitely. It would be very difficult for countries which fully comply with the Treaty and which are, for the same reason, negatively affected by the attitudes of non-complying countries, to support the NPT's extension as it stands now.

Having said this, let me clarify my Government's position *vis-à-vis* the Treaty itself. Turkey supports the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation

Treaty, as we have already stated on numerous occasions within the United Nations bodies and the relevant organs of the political and military alliances to which we are a party. We do not aim at opening the Treaty to re-negotiation. Our purpose is to protect it. However, there is an urgent need for strengthening its verification mechanisms. We believe that something should be done in conjunction with the extension of the NPT or separately in order to highlight the deficiencies of its verification regime, and to demonstrate to the potential violators of the Treaty that their attitude will not be overlooked or tolerated. We do not think that the international community can and must mobilize its military assets every time that a country has to be carried away with its nuclear ambitions.

We are convinced that ways and means should be sought and found for strengthening the verification regime without jeopardizing the existing text of the Treaty. It is our strongly held view that there is a sufficiently high accumulation of technical know-how and experience in today's world in the field of verification of various arms control arrangements. The international community is able to come up with an efficient system of international verification as far as the proliferation of nuclear weapons is concerned. In our view, a possible way to reach a solution for strengthening verification would be to create a separate negotiating process with the aim of having an international verification protocol which would then be attached to the Treaty itself. This protocol may even be open to yearly evaluation. If effective international verification can be brought into being, this, we believe, would further encourage the allocation of nuclear technology to peaceful uses by promoting licit commerce in nuclear material.

We are convinced that our thoughts will be shared by most members as well as by the observers of the Conference, which is not only a negotiating body but also the main think-tank in the field of disarmament. What we are seeking is in fact an initiation of a thinking process on how to strengthen the verification mechanism under the existing Treaty. We also believe that the Conference on Disarmament, especially once it decides to have some fresh blood by opening itself to new members, will constitute the best forum to undertake this task.

The President (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Turkey for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Norberg.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): Mr. President, I should like to begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference and to pledge to you the full support of my delegation.

In February this year, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baroness Margaretha af Ugglas, addressed the Conference on Disarmament and stated, inter alia, that the Conference must give the highest priority to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. A comprehensive nuclear test ban is an important instrument in preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and an essential step towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. As I recalled in an intervention in this forum about two months ago, the General Assembly of the United Nations last fall approved the resolution on a comprehensive test-ban treaty with a larger majority than ever. In that resolution all States are urged to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all nuclear test explosions for all time.

In the same intervention I also reminded the CD that Sweden two years ago presented a draft comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, contained in document CD/1089* of 31 July 1991. I stated that that proposal was still on the table, but that my Government had concluded that, due to the development since the proposal was submitted, some modifications were necessary. My delegation will today at the meeting with the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban present and circulate a revised draft treaty. First the revision contains a prohibition not only of all nuclear weapon test explosion but also of any other nuclear explosion. The reasoning is that Sweden has concluded that a ban should be total and comprehensive, thus including also an outright prohibition of all so-called peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). There are, in the view of the Swedish delegation, several good reasons for such an approach. The most important is that all PNEs imply a problem since experience gained from them might be used in the development of nuclear weapons. A ban on PNEs is thus an important non-proliferation measure. Furthermore, it seems to my delegation that there are increasing doubts as to the possibility of using PNEs for any practical purpose, not least taking into account environmental hazards.

The second main feature in the modified proposal is that the International Atomic Energy Agency would be entrusted with the verification of compliance with the treaty. The reason is that Sweden finds it questionable whether, in the nuclear field, the best and most cost-effective solution really would be to create a new specialized organization for verification. My Government has, after reconsidering this question, come to the conclusion that it would be a better solution to use the competence and experience gained by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Of course, additional resources and additional expertise have to be brought to the organization. Still it is the view of Sweden that using the International Atomic Energy Agency would be a better and more cost-effective solution than establishing a new specialized organization for the purpose of the treaty.

One of the main reasons for achieving a nuclear test ban, namely to halt the nuclear arms race among the present nuclear powers, has possibly become less significant as the world is now in fact experiencing nuclear disarmament. Yet a halt to nuclear tests, and to nuclear explosions in general, remains equally essential for other reasons, first and foremost as a means to halting the risk of nuclear proliferation. This new situation is reflected in the preambular paragraphs of the modified Swedish draft treaty, where besides the importance of further steps towards nuclear disarmament is also stressed the importance to take effective measures against the proliferation of nuclear arms.

It is my hope that the revised Swedish draft will serve as a fruitful input in the discussion on a nuclear test ban. This year an ad hoc committee on the issue is working. It is important to use that forum to accelerate the discussions. At present four of the five nuclear Powers are in practice observing a moratorium on nuclear testing. A favourable climate for progress towards a comprehensive test ban should therefore exist. A prolongation of the existing moratoria, as well as declarations of a moratorium by all nuclear-weapon States, would vigorously contribute to maintaining the momentum. Therefore, Sweden appeals to the nuclear-weapon States not to resume testing in order to confirm the present positive trends towards a nuclear test ban.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mr. Han.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, I would like first of all to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency for the Conference on Disarmament this month and wish you much success in your work.

The Conference on Disarmament has begun the second part of its session when world peace and security are being threatened by many factors. It is, as ever, an important task for the Conference on Disarmament to rapidly improve its functions and role and take international measures in a responsible manner on the immediate problems as well as long-term problems relating to disarmament. A comprehensive test-ban treaty, realization of nuclear non-proliferation and cessation of large-scale sale of sophisticated weapons become first major steps to achieving the goal for complete abolition of nuclear weapons and drastic cut in armament.

However, it throws new apprehensions and concerns to the international community that temporarily suspended nuclear tests would be resumed and nuclear technologies and/or materials are proliferated from the nuclear-weapon States to other regions in overt or covert forms. The reports that a large quantity of plutonium and nuclear materials have been transferred from the European nuclear-weapon States to the Far East region arouse deep misgivings among the people in this region where the atomic bombs were first used. The Conference on Disarmament, whose primary task is nuclear disarmament, should render a deserved concern to the fact that nuclear materials are concentrated and sales of highly explosive, modern weapons are on rise in the tensioned Far East region. These phenomena will undoubtedly further aggravate the existing tensions and pose a serious menace to the peace and security of this region.

As is shown by the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and the world statistics on arms trade, the nuclear States and the developed countries have the fundamental responsibilities for maintaining world peace and security, and the prospects for disarmament negotiations should be not bright unless those countries take decisive disarmament measures.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea long ago advanced a number of proposals to denuclearize the Korean peninsula and reunify the divided country peacefully and made all its sincere efforts for their effectuation in order to ensure peace and security in the Korean peninsula where the interests of the powers are concentrated. The fabricated nuclear suspicions and the complicated situations created therefrom have put a big obstacle to the above-mentioned efforts of my Government and brought the situation, which had turned into a road of detente, back to the original point of confrontation. This was stated in detail in the intervention of my delegation at the spring session.

This is, after all, a political problem between the United States and my country, and there is no other solution but only negotiation for this problem. Yesterday, the first high-level talk between the United States and my country was held, and I think that solutions could be found through continuous negotiations.

We made a proposal to south Korea to exchange special envoys appointed by the Chief Executives of the north and the south of Korea in order to discuss all-comprising issues for reunification including implementation of the Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and north-south contact is to be held for this purpose.

Those who really desire detente and peace in the Korean peninsula and the Far East will have to welcome and encourage these negotiation efforts.

However, last week, the delegation of Norway made the statement apparently in an attempt to put pressure upon us, only to reveal its ignorance of the essence of this matter and the recent developments.

My Government did never think of withdrawing from the NPT, only to be faithful in carrying out the obligations under this Treaty.

But, the adventurous military manoeuvres conducted under the pretext of nuclear problem and the adoption of IAEA resolution on "special inspection" have threatened the supreme interests of the country and compelled us to withdraw from this Treaty.

It requires to take a just and impartial stand before the clear facts of who are the offenders and victims, what is the cause and the result and who has really threatened peace and security. With regard to the unjust resolution of the United Nations Security Council, admission to or withdrawal from an international treaty belongs to the sovereignty of each country.

Our withdrawal from the NPT was a self-defensive measure taken in the exercise of the right pursuant to the NPT under the extraordinary situation in which the supreme interests of my country were exposed to grave threat. Therefore, it is not a matter to be discussed at the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations has no legality to adopt a "resolution" over our withdrawal from the NPT. It is unreasonable to talk about "reconsideration" or so.

The United Nations Charter has no article which stipulates that signatories to an international treaty should not withdraw from the treaty or that issue should be taken up with withdrawal from the treaty. The "double standard" of conniving at the offender and putting pressure upon the victim can by no means be justified.

Pressure and coercion cannot be a solution to a problem. Pressure can never work.

The statement of the Foreign Minister of Norway, who has defied all these facts, will only serve to spoil the atmosphere for smooth solution of the problem, which is currently being conducted. Negotiations, a practical way for solution of the problem should be supported and encouraged.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

We shall now proceed to consider the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. In conformity with our practice, the timetable has been prepared after consultations with the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies. As agreed at the presidential consultations held last week, the plenary meeting originally scheduled for Thursday, 10 June, will now be held instead on Tuesday, 8 June, at 10.a.m. so that the Conference may receive His Excellency the President of Argentina, Dr. Carlos Menem. We shall therefore proceed accordingly. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts this timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I would like to inform members, this morning, I learned that the G21 has requested that after this meeting an informal meeting be held for them to discuss document CD/1200, the draft decision put forward by the G21. At the request of the G21, document CD/1200 has been circulated at this meeting. As the President and in accordance with rule 19 of the rules of procedure of the Conference, I suggest that the meeting discuss this request and a decision be made. I am in the hands of the plenary. Now I would like to invite comments from delegations. If there is no objection, we shall so decide.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): Five minutes after the closure of the plenary we shall hold an informal plenary. The plenary has finished its work for today.

May I invite delegations to be available in the conference room next Tuesday not later than 10 a.m. so that we may start the plenary meeting as soon as the President of Argentina arrives. In view of the high level visit on that occasion, may I invite you to wear your identification badges in order to facilitate entrance to the Conference room as well as to the gallery.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 8 June, at 10 a.m. sharp. The plenary stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.

(145)

CD/PV.652
8 June 1993

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 8 June 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Hou Zhitong (China)

GE.93-61073 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 652nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

It is a great honour for me to extend, on behalf of the Conference and myself, a warm welcome to the President of Argentine Republic, Dr. Carlos Menem, who will be addressing us today. Of course, there is no need for me to introduce the President. His success in modernizing the Argentine economy and fighting inflation, while at the same time reducing unemployment significantly, are well known and have deserved wide international recognition. In the field of international relations, we are all familiar with the concern and dedication of the President in respect of the great issues facing the international community in these times of change, in particular his decisive role in developing effective arrangements in Latin America to ensure that nuclear energy is utilized only for peaceful purposes. Other initiatives that he has taken in the political and economic fields have also contributed to strengthening peace and security in the region, in line with his deep concern with Latin American issues. I am sure that the President will be pleased to know that, among the many members of delegations and the public present today in the Council chamber, on the occasion of his visit, there is a delegation from the Congress of Chile, whom I also welcome among us.

His Excellency Carlos Menem also conducts a very active foreign policy in the global context, as is proved by his presence in Geneva this week and his personal contributions to various multilateral forums as well as a dynamic bilateral diplomacy at the highest level. His efforts to intensify the participation of Argentina in the international scene are equally reflected in this Conference. I assure you, Mr. President, that here in Geneva we are very well informed of your disarmament initiatives.

Allow me also, in my capacity as representative of China, to highlight the importance we attach to our relations with your great country. Argentina and China established diplomatic relations more than 20 years ago. Since then Sino-Argentine relations have continuously developed and improved in many areas. Friendly cooperation between the two countries has been raised to a new level by the mutual visits of high-level political leaders during recent years, especially the official visit of Chinese President Yang Shangkun to Argentina in May 1990 and the return visit to China by His Excellency President Carlos Menem in November of the same year. I am sure that all members of the Conference appreciate your decision to address us and will follow your statement with special interest. I now give the floor to the President of the Argentine Republic, his Excellency Mr. Carlos Menem.

Mr. MENEM (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, allow me at the outset of my statement to thank you for the kind words with which you had the courtesy to welcome me to this plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. The People's Republic of China, which you represent, is one of the key participants in the historic epoch in which we live. It is an additional source of satisfaction for me as well as for my country to have the privilege of addressing this Conference under your presidency, as our two peoples, besides being participants in and members of this forum, share a history of fertile, frank and friendly relations. The era in which it is our destiny to live is placed under the dual sign of challenge and hope.

Challenge in the face of the need to ensure the coexistence of 5 billion people who make up an international system which is truly global in nature. It also bears the sign of hope, the hope of being able to fulfil our responsibilities at this time of transition towards what will be a new period in the history of mankind. The fall of the Berlin Wall prompted a natural triumphant euphoria because it represented the surmounting of a political and ideological confrontation that had thwarted strategic options for 40 years. The dynamics of international relations have also changed. Confrontation has been succeeded by a different order based on basic principles such as the renunciation of the use of force to settle international conflicts, and efforts to make respect for fundamental freedoms, democracy and human rights a reality. The renunciation of the use of force and the full-scale operation of the system of collective security enshrined in the United Nations Charter appear to be closer to implementation than ever before. There is also a growing international consensus on the need to preserve individual freedoms through the adoption of democratic political systems. Argentina supports the renewed role of the Security Council because we believe in the functioning of a stable international system where peace and security would not be jeopardized. This assertion is in no way invalidated by the many regrettable regional conflicts that are occurring today. These tragic situations would certainly be even worse were it not for the operation of the fundamental agreement which makes the effectiveness of the Security Council possible.

The Gulf war opened a new chapter in United Nations history as the collective security machinery worked efficiently and breaches of international peace and security were drastically curbed. A dramatic change has taken place in the organization and its responsibilities have proliferated through the peace-keeping and peace-making forces. This process has recently begun and promises to intensify in the future. My country has decided to contribute actively to the stability of the system by supporting and cooperating with the initiatives of the United Nations, as is shown by our participation in the Gulf war and the United Nations peace-keeping forces, to which we contributed the largest contingent from Latin America. The order that may be glimpsed brings us closer to the preservation of a system of shared values. All of us, absolutely all of us, must shoulder our responsibilities. The fragile equation of peace means not just the absence of war but the commitment to accept the other side as part of our destiny. Now that the era of blocs which divided the world is over, we must promote a regime of integration.

The end of the cold war has promoted a more constructive approach through the development of concepts such as "cooperative security". My country together with others seeks to secure the necessary means to reduce in a collective manner the possibility and scope of possible aggression. As a point of departure this presupposes agreement on priority tasks of national armed forces, namely the defence of the territory and participation in multinational forces for the maintenance, establishment or restoration of peace. We wish to establish a regional security framework banning weapons of mass destruction, and set up an effective system of verification of compliance therewith, and to foster the consideration of a monitoring system for conventional armaments in the region, properly and adequately taking care of legitimate national defence requirements and stimulating a regional context of confidence, transparency and detente.

An essential aspect of cooperative security lies in Chapter VII of the Charter, which confers on the United Nations the function of organizing multinational forces to confront aggression if it occurs. In this structure, the use of multinational forces is the last resort when all preventive or coercive measures have proved ineffective. This commitment brings efficiency and credibility to the system, thus contributing to prevention and deterrence.

The achievements made in international disarmament have been truly surprising. Among them are the START agreements for the elimination of strategic arms, the elimination of intermediate-range missiles, the reduction of conventional forces in Europe and the decision to eliminate chemical weapons through the recent Convention adopted this year. These achievements bear witness to the steady progress being made in this respect.

However, I should like to share some ideas with all of you. Firstly, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There is a shared responsibility by all States to meet the commitment to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies. There are no watertight compartments in this matter. The risks are common to all of us, and consequently self-restraint is the prime duty incumbent upon us as responsible participants in international society. This principle of self-restraint is undoubtedly the expression of a commitment implicit in universal culture, the final goal of the complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. The experience of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms by a country in the Middle East prior to the Gulf war, and of course the breach of its agreements, with the International Atomic Energy Agency, offer clear examples for future action by the international community.

No country is unimportant when it comes to preserving international security. The most modest fertilizer plant can quickly be converted into a supplier for chemical warfare; a small reactor may build up the critical mass to be used in a nuclear warhead. Hence non-proliferation becomes of self-evident importance in building a much safer world. My Government has been guided by these principles in its domestic and international actions. Firstly, we have drawn up and adopted a body of domestic legislation instituting a strict system of export control related to chemical, biological, nuclear and missile materials, and established a national commission for the control of sensitive exports which is now fully operational. This is reinforced by our well-known efforts together with Brazil as part of a common nuclear policy which culminated in the establishment of a bi-national verification agency and the full-scope safeguards agreement with IAEA. Again, along with Mexico and Chile we have promoted and approved the amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which will very shortly come fully into force, thus bringing into being the first effective and verifiably nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world.

Our country has also decided to accede to the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Through these measures we have reaffirmed the decision of our Government to have a conventional military capacity and equipment for strictly defensive purposes.

Second, we also know that without transparency there will be no confidence. One of the most promising trends in the field of security and disarmament diplomacy is the growing importance of confidence-building measures. The establishment of an international register of arms transfers and other similar mechanisms for confidence-building must be consolidated through their implementation and gradual improvement. This strengthens the principle of self-defence in the face of any surreptitious attempt to prepare surprise attacks. Argentina has resolutely joined this process, and we are working with Latin American Governments to make military transparency a common principle in our region. We support the initiative for the convening of a regional conference on the confidence-building measures in Latin America. We must evaluate their possible adaptation to our regional circumstances and shoulder our responsibilities in the area of defence and security.

As a third idea we must think of the maintenance and restoration of peace, this complex and multi-faceted task involved in building a structure of confidence for world security. Here I am not referring to mere respect for contractual commitments, but to the specific action required to deal with breaches of commitments or of international law. At times it is necessary to restore what has been broken. This is where the United Nations acquires a leading role in restoring peace. Argentina actively supports the implementation of the United Nations Charter because it believes that only through its application will the Organization become effective.

The post-cold-war order is in the process of construction, and each of us on this planet bears a responsibility in its design. Argentina has entered into international commitments at both regional and global levels, as a positive contribution to creating stability in international relations based on these principles. My Government proposes as the main objective of its security policy to seek - through dialogue - a greater degree of confidence among nations by means of the creation of transparent forms of cooperation that will foster a stable and democratic international order which will preserve international peace and security.

We are living in a world in transition. Our view is that this opens up for mankind a window of opportunities without historical precedent. To explore these opportunities is the last challenge of this century. Like Clio, the muse of the historical past in mythology, history with a capital H stands before us. It carries with it the sempiternal questions, those that relate to peace and war, the destruction or creation of a world of peace. Let us find the means of providing the answers to those age-old questions. Let us be capable of imagining a world of cooperative security - a world where peace will be a definitive reality, with the full force of our belief in God, the source of all reason and justice. Thank you very much. May God bless you.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the President of the Argentine Republic, Dr. Carlos Menem, for his important and far-reaching statement which will constitute an important point of reference for our work

(The President)

in the Conference on Disarmament. I also wish to thank him deeply for the kind words he addressed to my country and to myself. I now intend to suspend the meeting for five minutes so that I may accompany the President of the Argentine Republic on his departure from the Palais des Nations. May I invite delegations to remain in the conference room until the President leaves.

The meeting was suspended at 10.40 a.m. and resumed at 10.45 a.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The 652nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

I also have on the list of speakers for today the representative of Peru, Ambassador Urrutia, who is present in the plenary for the first time since he assumed his new functions. I welcome him warmly and wish to assure him of the close cooperation of my delegation in the exercise of the heavy responsibilities assigned to him by his Government. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Peru, Ambassador Urrutia.

Mr. URRUTIA (Peru) (translated from Spanish): It is a great honour for me today to address this plenary for the first time in my capacity as head of the delegation of Peru to the sole multilateral negotiating disarmament body. I am particularly pleased to do so, moreover, under your Presidency, Ambassador Hou Zhitong, because I am aware of your great personal skills and because you represent a country with large responsibilities in the matter at hand, with which Peru maintains excellent relations. My delegation also thanks your predecessor, Ambassador Gerald Shannon, and the delegation of Canada for the effective way in which they guided the work of the Conference in the previous period.

Destiny has willed it that my first statement in plenary has been preceded by the important and very significant statement by his Excellency the President of the Argentine Republic, Dr. Carlos Menem, the first Latin American head of State to appear before this Conference and the leader of a brother country whose links with my own go back many centuries. The presence of President Menem - whose words I had the privilege to hear yesterday at the International Labour Conference - should be interpreted as a demonstration of commitment not only by the Argentine Republic but by all of Latin America to peace, disarmament and international security and the strengthening of this forum.

Allow me through you, Mr. President, to extend to all the delegations of member States, the observers and His Excellency the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and the entire secretariat, the cordial greetings of the Government of Peru, my own and those of my delegation. As of now I should like to pledge our fullest cooperation so that together we can discharge the lofty duties that his forum is to assume in the new international post-cold-war context. In taking up the special task entrusted to me by my Government of representing it before this Conference, I should also like to extend my gratitude for the tokens of understanding and appreciation expressed by many delegations for the work of my predecessor Ambassador Oswaldo de Rivero and Minister Counsellor Felix Calderón. We shall do everything

necessary to continue the excellent work performed by Ambassador de Rivero and thus to serve the common interests of Peru and those of this Conference on Disarmament.

It is not my intention at this time to dwell on all the important issues which are part of our written agenda or our ideal agenda in the new international context. I will reserve that task for a forthcoming meeting of the Conference. Nevertheless, I shall briefly refer to some fundamental aspects. Allow me first of all to reaffirm the very keen interest of Peru in the work of this Conference, as well as the work it may carry out in future. The world was happily able to survive the grave risks of nuclear confrontation which characterized the East-West confrontation, but as has been said here by very distinguished speakers the world is currently no more secure than before but more complicated. The states of equilibrium are more complex and less obvious, and the risks and threats have diversified. In the face of this we must pursue the evaluation and identification of the current components of international security and begin to work on that basis in the aspects which fall to us. The report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on "New dimensions of disarmament and arms regulations in the post-cold-war era" contains important elements in this direction.

A comprehensive nuclear-test-bank treaty (CTBT) should be this Conference's first priority. We firmly hope that the positive trends in the current context will be confirmed and that we will soon be able to begin preliminary work on the drafting of the treaty here. In this context we should like to express our gratitude to Sweden for submitting a new version of its draft treaty, and to Ambassador Tanaka of Japan for the effective manner in which he has been conducting the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. We hope that the draft decision submitted by the Group of 21 on this item will receive the support of all the members of the Conference.

Peru supports the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. This Treaty constitutes the corner-stone of the world's non-proliferation regime and, far from questioning it in one way or another, we must reaffirm our confidence in it, extend it indefinitely and do everything necessary to achieve full compliance with each and every one of its provisions. The same principle of pacta sunt servanda which we apply in good faith in all our international commitments must be demanded here without any discrimination whatsoever. The full realization of the objectives and purposes of the Treaty will derive from the firm political will of the States parties rather than from a sword of Damocles hanging threateningly over it. The Conference on Disarmament can and must contribute to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. The beginning of work to draft a treaty for the cessation of nuclear testing and the search for an instrument acceptable to all providing security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons, inter alia, would be two steps which in themselves would justify the efforts of this Conference, without detracting from the others. We appeal to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the non-proliferation treaty.

We also welcome the progress that is being made in the context of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We hope that the regime established therein will soon enter into force for all States in the region. Tlatelolco is undoubtedly one of Latin America's greatest contributions to international peace and stability. I might also mention, inter alia, the 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho and the 1991 Cartagena and Mendoza declarations.

I am also happy to highlight the recent election of a distinguished Peruvian diplomat as Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) based in Mexico.

Peru supports all the efforts made in this Conference and elsewhere to give transparency to the acquisition and production of armaments as an important confidence-building measure. We have supported all United Nations resolutions in this field and we hope soon to convey the information requested to the Secretary-General. The Congress of my country, which is currently revising the Constitution of the Republic, will in due course take up for approval the Convention on chemical weapons drawn up in Geneva by many of those present here. Some of the concepts contained in the Convention, however, have already been incorporated in the draft Constitution which is to be adopted in the next few months.

Finally, and without wishing to exhaustive on the items of interest to us, my country supports the early, though limited, expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. We stand ready to give our consent to such a move as long as it maintains a geographical and strategic balance amongst its members.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me and to my country. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

We shall now proceed to consider the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. As agreed at the Presidential consultations, the Conference will hold a plenary meeting on Wednesday, 16 June at 10 a.m. to listen to the address to be delivered by His Excellency the President of Romania. So far, the regular plenary meeting on Thursday, 17 June is maintained. I intend to return to this question at the Presidential consultations tomorrow afternoon, after our informal meeting, in the light of the situation concerning the list of speakers for that date. The timetable is, of course, purely indicative and has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is subject to change if necessary. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): In accordance with the timetable just adopted, the next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Wednesday, 16 June at 10 a.m. As in the case of this plenary meeting, I invite members to make themselves available at 10 a.m. at the latest, so that the plenary meeting may begin as soon as the President of Romania arrives. I also invite members to wear their identification badges in order to facilitate entrance to the conference room, as well as to the gallery.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.

CD/PV.653
16 June 1993

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Wednesday, 16 June 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Hou Zhitong (China)

GE.93-61207 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 653rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

It is a great honour for me and on behalf of the Conference to extend a warm welcome to the President of Romania, His Excellency Ion Iliescu, who is addressing the plenary meeting today. The President is at present leading a process of far-reaching development in the political, economic and social fields of his country, which has made a significant contribution to peace and security in Europe. In addition, Romania has been active in arms control and disarmament, including the Conference on Disarmament. His Excellency Ion Iliescu has played an important role at various stages of the recent history of Romania, in particular in asserting its sovereignty and independence from foreign domination and control and also in promoting the democratization of political life in his country. More recently, he assumed the heavy responsibilities of high office after achieving a substantial majority in the national elections held on 11 October 1992. All through his life the President has combined his political career with his activities as a distinguished scientist, devoting his professional concerns to the management and conservation of Romania's water resources, as well as to a number of environmental questions relating to modern science and technology. He has also promoted wide international contacts in various areas of scientific research.

Please allow me to take this opportunity to point out that the traditional friendship between the peoples of China and Romania, and the cooperation between the two countries in the political, economic and cultural fields, continues to develop. The high-level mutual visits between the officials of the two countries in recent years will further strengthen and promote these relations of friendship and cooperation. I am sure, Mr. President, that all members of the Conference welcome your interest in our work and will follow your address today in that spirit. I now give the floor to the President of Romania, His Excellency Ion Iliescu.

Mr. ILIESCU (Romania): It gives me particular pleasure to address this unique forum of negotiations in the field of arms control and disarmament. Its activities and the results are linked to so many hopes that the world may become a safer and better place for all nations on the threshold of the new millennium. I am pleased to take the floor at this time, when the Geneva Conference is presided by you, Mr. President, an eminent representative of the People's Republic of China, with which Romania enjoys relations of active cooperation and mutual respect. I am moved to be speaking here at the Palais des Nations, where 62 years ago the illustrious Romanian and European politician and diplomat, Nicolae Titulescu, with his impressive foresight, said that "the conference on disarmament will be the cornerstone of understanding among nations". His words are today more topical than ever.

Acting professionally, the Conference on Disarmament has achieved remarkable results. The most recent one, but also one of the most important, is the Convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The duties of the Geneva Conference and the expectations of all nations are even greater in the new international political and military environment. We are all vitally interested in the dynamics and efficiency of its negotiations. As a result of the end of the cold war, the release of international relations from the ideological burden, as well as the crumbling of the pillars of the past, the risk of an East-West military confrontation has practically disappeared. Moreover, the structural changes in Central and Eastern Europe as well as the evolution in other parts of the world have created a new regional and world security environment. All these provide an incentive for relaunching negotiations, for imaginative approaches and achieving new progress on the road of arms regulations and disarmament.

The United Nations revival in accordance with its natural vocation, as defined by the Charter, the increasing roles of the General Assembly and especially of the Security Council, the strengthening of the CSCE and other regional structures, seem to confirm the growing ascendancy of the political over the military factor. This should bring about a genuinely positive change also for disarmament negotiations, as an integral part of the process for enhancing international peace and security. New standards of political and military conduct among nations have to be agreed upon, based on practical measures of arms control and reductions, and the strengthening of confidence and security.

Zones of instability, conflict and tension seem to proliferate all over the world. The Yugoslav tragedy is particularly dangerous for the peace and security of the whole of Europe, as it has brought back the flames of the war on the continent for the first time in more than 40 years. Other conflicts, in the former Soviet Union, as well as in other parts of the world, are no less preoccupying. On the European continent the widening economic gap between the new democracies in their transition towards the market economy and the developed countries is, together with other non-conventional risk factors, one of the main sources of instability and insecurity in Europe. Certainly, disarmament negotiations cannot provide answers and miraculous solutions to all problems. But I am confident that the Geneva disarmament Conference can, and has the ability to, exercise a significantly greater impact in its field of competence in support of the great political, economic and social processes which dominate the end of the twentieth century. Indeed, this is the challenge. It is a challenge for the Geneva Conference, for the participating States and undoubtedly for their representatives gathered here.

Romania approaches in a constructive spirit the questions regarding the Conference agenda, its structures and work methods. We welcome the present reflection process on the whole of the multilateral debating and negotiating mechanisms on arms control, disarmament, confidence-building and security-strengthening. Above its technical aspects, this is a political work which requires both a realistic foundation and a sense of vision, so that it can provide viable answers to the current and future security concerns of all nations. It is our hope that the result of the ongoing dialogue will be to optimize the relationships among the various structures, to update their agendas, to define the new priority objectives and to devise ways and means to achieve them.

Several items on the Conference agenda retain your attention, that seem to be among the more promising for negotiation and action at this stage. I would only refer to one of growing interest for the international community, namely "Transparency in armaments". It is of increasing concern for the United Nations, towards which the Geneva Conference on Disarmament cannot remain silent. Conventional arms are the ones used in the "hot spots" of our planet. Arms transfers often represent the main destabilizing factor in many regions of the world. Moreover, the balance of forces established over time or by international agreements in various sensitive regions and zones can be undermined through preferential conventional arms transfer policies. Under these circumstances, we believe that transparency in armaments, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, should rightfully hold an important place in the overall future activities of the Geneva Conference. In our view, the overall aspects regarding transparency in armaments could be regulated through an international treaty of universal vocation, which would set standards and procedures, as well as appropriate implementation mechanisms. In order to break the ground for such a comprehensive and complex work, the first stage could be aimed at agreed guidelines to serve as an international code of conduct. The experience of the five permanent members of the Security Council in this field could represent a starting-point and a useful contribution for the future efforts of the Geneva Conference, as well as those of the United Nations, the CSCE and various regional bodies.

Your negotiations will be successful to the extent that the political will of your Governments is able to place the common interests of nations to live in peace and security above all other considerations. I take this opportunity to address to the Geneva Conference an appeal to spare no energy in order to advance towards arms reduction and disarmament, confidence and security. As a faithful member of the United Nations and of the Conference on Disarmament, and as a partner in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, Romania wishes to cooperate closely with the other participating States for these goals. I wish you every success in your endeavour to the benefit of international peace and security.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the President of Romania, His Excellency Ion Iliescu, for his important and comprehensive statement, which will be a valuable reference for our future work. I am also very grateful for his kind words addressed to my country and to myself.

I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. I invite delegations to remain in the conference room until the President leaves it.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held tomorrow, 17 June, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.40 a.m.